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INTRODUCTION
Because the First Amendment first came alive in cases where the
Supreme Court invalidated municipal efforts to criminalize political
1
speech in public places, the Court’s “public forum” doctrine is
historically and conceptually intertwined with the very idea of free
speech in the United States. Before the organizing image of the
2
“traditional public forum” came to define and anchor the
constitutional status of public property, political expression enjoyed
3
almost no constitutional protection. In practical terms, political
expression was considered to be a limited privilege of private
property ownership rather than the universal birthright of a
4
sovereign democratic citizenry.
Since the mid-20th century, the relative ubiquity and democratic
character of the public forum have given free speech central
5
instrumental and symbolic value in American life. Open public
spaces like parks, sidewalks, streets, and other accessible governmentowned properties have served as the most effective and reliable arena
1. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516-18 (1939) (holding invalid ordinances
prohibiting leafleting and “public assembly” in city streets and other public places
without a permit); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (invalidating
ordinances prohibiting or restricting leafleting in public places). Professor David
Rabban has shown that there was considerable First Amendment litigation prior to
the period between World War I and World War II, but that throughout “the period
from the Civil War to World War I, the overwhelming majority of decisions in all
jurisdictions rejected free speech claims . . . .” David M. Rabban, Free Speech: The Lost
Years, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 145, 147 (2000). See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 131 (1997) (noting that a widespread hostility existed
toward free speech claims during this period regardless of the person or issue
involved, and thus courts often simply ignored the existence of the claims).
2. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(defining “traditional public forums” as places that have been “devoted to assembly
and debate” throughout history such as streets and parks); see also infra pp. 184-89
(discussing the development of the “traditional public forum” doctrine).
3. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (articulating the
traditional position taken by the courts that legislatures have the power to regulate
public use of public spaces, including the right to prohibit public speaking in such
places); see also infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
4. See generally John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the
First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 58 (1996) (advocating a return to a propertybased vision of the First Amendment where free speech was considered a property
right of the individual rather than a “means of self-governance”).
5. See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (noting how the public forum
has been accessible by all and allows the dissemination of ideas in areas of symbolic
and political importance).
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of communication for all citizens regardless of their political
ideology, private wealth, property ownership, social status, or
6
popularity. This is why the traditional public forum has been called
7
the “poor man’s printing press.” Whether the speakers are labor
organizers educating workers about the National Labor Relations Act
8
and challenging a corrupt urban political machine, an individual
9
conducting a “solitary vigil” against racism in school, a civil rights
10
movement engaged in mass protest, or religious proselytizers
11
spreading their gospel, the public forum empowers citizens to
assemble, associate, agitate, persuade, and disseminate their views.
The public forum, while almost always besieged by public officials,
has become both an indispensable means of expression in the real
world and the central metaphor for “uninhibited, robust, and wide12
open” dialogue in society generally.
In 1998, in a case deeply colored by the exclusionary politics of the
13
“two-party system,” the Supreme Court dangerously eroded the
principle of political free expression in limited public and nonpublic
6. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30 (1965) (“[T]he parade, the picket, the leaflet, [and] the sound
truck have been the media of communication exploited by those with little access to
the more genteel means of communication.”); see also infra pp. 185-87 (discussing the
use of public fora for speech purposes by a variety of groups who could lack access to
other modes of mass media).
7. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20, 40 (1975) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30 (1965)). Apparently, Kalven derived this
phrase from Justice Black’s description of the door-to-door distribution of leaflets as
an activity “essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.” See id. at 130
n.101 (quoting Black’s majority opinion in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146
(1943)).
8. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 501-05 (1939) (explaining that respondent’s
sole objective was merely to explain to workingmen the purposes of the Act and to
organize workers into unions lawfully and peacefully).
9. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (discussing
how Mosley protested on the sidewalk near a school, and later sued to invalidate on
First Amendment grounds, an ordinance permitting labor picketing in this area but
prohibiting all other kinds).
10. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963) (reversing
the criminal convictions of black students arrested for breach of the peace for
peacefully walking down two city blocks in protest).
11. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448, 450-53 (1938) (striking down an
ordinance, challenged by religious proselytizers, which banned the distribution of
literature in Griffin, Georgia without advance permission of the City Manager).
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Of course, Sullivan
concerned constitutional standards governing state libel law in the context of alleged
newspaper defamation, but the First Amendment has considerably more scope than
merely protecting the rights of newspapers.
13. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998)
(holding that Arkansas’ state-owned public television network’s decision to exclude a
third-party congressional candidate from a televised debate between his Democratic
and Republican rivals did not violate the First Amendment).
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speech fora by upholding the exclusion of an Independent
congressional candidate from a state-run television channel’s
14
candidate debate. Now, the Court’s alarming nonchalance about
resurgent government manipulation of speech rights and the public’s
political consciousness has spread right down to the old-fashioned
15
public forum: the street itself.
16
The Court’s decision last year in Hill v. Colorado, a case deeply
colored by abortion politics, has opened the door widely to a new era
17
of restrictive speech regulation within traditional public fora. The
Hill majority upheld a remarkable ban on the core speech activity of:
knowingly approach[ing] another person within eight feet of such
person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing
a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or
sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any
18
entrance door to a health care facility.

The decision reflects a disoriented attitude by the Court’s majority
about aggressive legislative assaults on free speech rights in the most
public spaces. Disturbingly, the Court made it substantially easier for
government entities to discriminate against disfavored viewpoints in
the public forum provided that their enactments maintain the
19
thinnest façade of neutrality. Indeed, with its nouveau validation of a
countervailing interest in being left alone in the First Amendment
context, Hill becomes a virtual template for developing passable
government speech regulations targeted at the expression of
20
unpopular views in public places. If left uncorrected, this precedent
14. See id. at 672, 683 (refusing to extend the “public forum doctrine” to the
public television broadcasting context on grounds that the candidate was excluded
not because his views were unpopular but rather because of a lack of public support
and interest in his platform). But see Jamin B. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1943, 1948 (1999) (arguing that the majority in Forbes “mislabeled what was
clearly a designated public forum as a nonpublic forum and . . . denied the obvious
presence of viewpoint discrimination by confusing this objective concept with
subjective political animus, thus watering down a pivotal First Amendment
doctrine.”) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
15. See generally Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (upholding a statute
which prohibited a person from coming within eight feet of someone who was within
100 feet of a health care facility with the objective of displaying signs, protesting, and
passing leaflets); see also infra pp. 185-89 (describing contemporary governmental
restraints on popular media).
16. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
17. See id. at 2519 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In a further glaring departure from
precedent we learn today that citizens have a right to avoid unpopular speech in a
public forum.”).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
19. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2491-94 (holding that the statute was content-neutral
despite its obvious effect of targeting anti-abortion protestors).
20. See id. at 2489-90 (maintaining that individuals have a right “to be let alone”
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could proliferate facially neutral but functionally discriminatory
speech regulations that will chill and diminish the free public
discourse vital to popular democracy.
The constitutionality of the Colorado statute at issue in Hill was
tested on various grounds, but this Article focuses on the Court’s
most corrosive holding that the challenged provision was neither
content-based nor viewpoint-based. Part I explains the emergence of
the public forum doctrine and its central importance to free speech
in American democracy. Part II describes the Colorado statute,
litigation of the case, and the majority’s decision. Part II analyzes the
Hill Court’s ruling affirming the statute’s content and viewpoint
neutrality, and contends that the Court deployed a pinched and
disingenuous interpretation of the doctrine of content and viewpoint
discrimination. Part II also reviews a variety of evidence, dismissed or
ignored by the Court, which suggested that, putting aside its
purported interest in neutral health and safety regulation, Colorado
targeted its statute directly at anti-abortion protesters and selected
their disfavored speech activities for discriminatory treatment.
To rescue indispensable First Amendment values and protections,
Part III recommends that for Free Speech Clause review purposes the
Court adopt what we call an “objective purpose and function-based
discrimination analysis” analogous to that which has evolved in the
religion and equal protection contexts. This analytical tool will help
courts properly distinguish between speech-respectful statutes
governing conduct that do not impede social discourse and those
speech-discriminatory laws for which facial neutrality is most plausibly
seen as camouflage and subterfuge. Part IV strips away the doctrinal
pretenses of both the majority and dissenting opinions and examines
what was truly at issue in Hill: the social value and constitutional
status of aggressive anti-abortion speech outside abortion clinics.
This Part attempts to reunify a libertarian jurisprudence of
reproductive rights with a libertarian jurisprudence of speech. Part
IV insists that the constitutional value of democratic expression is too
important for games of judicial make-believe, and liberal justices
should not allow the complicated street theater of anti-abortion
politics to distort fundamental First Amendment principles and
commitments.

which encompasses a right to “avoid unwanted communication” and this right may
outweigh another individual’s First Amendment right of free speech).
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUM AS A
SANCTUARY FOR FREE SPEECH AND INCUBATOR OF
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
Uninhibited and impassioned public discourse is the essential
21
Writing for the Court in
condition of political democracy.
Terminiello v. Chicago, Justice Douglas captured this relationship:
[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends
on free discussion. . . . [I]t is only through free debate and free
exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will
of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore
one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian
regimes. Accordingly[,] a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike
at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. . . . There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by
22
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.

As democracy depends on free speech, free speech depends on the
wide-open availability of the traditional public forum to citizens for
23
speech purposes. It may be tempting to think that the public forum
is an obsolescent concept in the new age of information, but today
many, perhaps most, Americans still face highly restricted access to
24
mass media. Newspapers, magazines, and book publishing houses
are privately owned and their content is dictated by rigid space
constraints, profit considerations, and ideologically-slanted editorial
25
control. Access to television and radio is likewise constrained by the
21. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (noting the great importance of
free speech to a democratic society and invalidating an ordinance which prohibited
any speech that “stirred people to anger, invite public dispute, or brought about a
condition of unrest”).
22. Id.
23. See Kalven, Jr., supra note 6, at 11-12 (“In an open democratic society the
streets, the parks, and other public places are an important facility for public
discussion and political process.”).
24. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting how “indispensable communication in [public fora] is to people who lack
access to more elaborate (and more costly) channels” of communication).
25. See ROBERT MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 37-63, 77 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1999) (discussing the negative
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reality of private corporate control over the channels of broadcast.
A citizen-speaker may seek paid advertising in these media, but that
option assumes the speaker has sufficient economic resources and, in
any event, he or she will still have to survive the inevitable editorial
27
pressures if the message is controversial.
Although the Internet
offers a more open medium, Internet access is substantially
controlled by private service providers and requires the purchase of—
28
and ability to use—computer hardware and software. Moreover, the
speaker may still have to rely on the editorial friendliness of website
editors unless the speaker has the financial and technological
29
resources necessary to create the speaker’s own website. Thus, for
those without money, computers, and the eloquence or politically
correct message required to attract the favor of corporate mass
media, the traditional public forum remains the only medium that
30
many people can feasibly “commandeer.”
Even if citizen-speakers have access to the Internet or other media,
the physical public forum often remains the indispensable locale for
31
message dissemination.
The “essential feature” of protests and
other speech activities in public places is their direct and dramatic
impact that conglomeration and “hypercommercialization” have had on the media
industry).
26. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 36-39 (arguing that media owners and managers have control over which
individuals’ views and stories will be heard by the public).
27. See id. at 39-40.
[T]hose facts, ideas and perspectives most likely to gain media access . . . are
those appealing to the self-interest of those individuals who own and manage
the media . . . Because these groups tend to embrace established and
traditional perspectives, media managers are unlikely to disseminate
frequently those ideas most challenging to conventional wisdom and the
established power structure.
Id.
28. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, fewer than half of all
American households—only forty-two percent—had Internet access in August 2000,
despite a fifty-eight percent increase from 1998 to 2000. See NAT’L TELECOMM. AND
INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL
INCLUSION, Exec. Summary (2000), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/
contents00.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2001). The share of individuals using the
Internet in August 2000 was forty-four percent. Id. In addition, “noticeable divides
still exist between those with different levels of income and education, different
racial and ethnic groups, old and young, single and dual-parent families, and those
with and without disabilities.” Id. For example, black and Hispanic Americans have
the lowest rates of household Internet access at 23.5% and 23.6%, respectively. Id.
29. See Greg Taylor, Your On-Ramp to the Internet: Is Your Dealership Born to Ride the
Worldwide Web?, DEALERNEWS, Sept. 1, 2000, at 32 (estimating that the cost of building
a website ranges from $500 to $20,000 depending on the design).
30. See Kalven, Jr., supra note 6, at 12 (discussing how the streets, parks, and
other public places are a “public forum that the citizen can commandeer”).
31. See Ingber, supra note 26, at 41 (discussing the powerful nature of the public
forum as opposed to other forms of communication).
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32

“appeal to public opinion.” Use of the public forum not only allows
the speaker to interact directly with other citizens, but also improves
the broader dissemination of the message. By bringing the clash of
ideas to a site of relevant symbolic importance like the sidewalk near
a military recruitment office, a business paying low wages, an abortion
clinic, an anti-abortion church, or the headquarters of a large
multinational corporation, the speaker delivers the message to a
33
larger audience. The spectacle of vivid speech encounters at nerve
centers of social controversy often attracts the attention of other
media, such as newspapers or television stations, thereby multiplying
exponentially the reach of the message.
The protected status of traditional public fora has been enshrined
in our jurisprudence since the American labor movement, desperate
to organize but repressed in the workplace, fought for the right to
34
campaign and agitate on public property in the 1930s.
The
traditional position of the courts, as expounded by Oliver Wendell
35
Holmes in the oft-cited Commonwealth v. Davis, had been that
municipal corporations had the same power to forbid and censor
speech on their property as did private homeowners or
36
corporations. But Justice Roberts articulated the new public forum
37
doctrine in 1939 in Hague v. CIO, in this now-classic statement:
[the] use of the streets and public places [for speech] has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States
to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions . . . is not absolute . . . but it must not, in the guise of
38
regulation, be abridged or denied.

Whatever its historical accuracy, the Hague Court’s emphatic
pronouncement that the right to speak and assemble peacefully in
public was part of the ancient rights of democratic citizenship made
32. See Kalven, Jr., supra note 6, at 11 (noting that the purpose of mass protest in
public places such as civil rights demonstrations is not to violate the law but rather to
attract public opinion).
33. See Ingber, supra note 26, at 44-46 (noting that people who lack direct access
to the mass media may use public fora to gain media attention).
34. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(articulating for the first time the public forum doctrine and holding that labor
organizers could not be prevented from distributing leaflets and assembling in
public places).
35. 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895).
36. See id. at 113 (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his
house.”).
37. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
38. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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clear that those with political power, such as Jersey City Mayor Hague,
could not use their offices to stifle political expression by citizens in
public places.
Shortly after the Hague decision, the full Court embraced the
39
doctrine. In Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court struck down municipal
ordinances restricting the distribution of leaflets and other literature
in the streets, sidewalks, and other public places, recognizing “the
constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart
40
information through speech or the distribution of literature.” The
Court explained that the public forum right did not permit an
individual to stand in the street and block traffic or obstruct the
41
passage of pedestrians on a sidewalk, but ruled that any such
regulations of speech activity must be subjected to close judicial
42
43
scrutiny. Because speech rights are so critical, they deserve strong
protection against legislative invasion. For example, a public forum
speech restriction cannot be excused by the fact that a speaker
repressed by it remains free to disseminate his message through other
44
media.
Nor can a regulation be justified on the ground that,
without it, the state’s attempts to address legitimate non-speech social
problems such as littering or fraud might be made somewhat less
45
46
effective. Here, one sees the emergence of modern strict scrutiny.
The early Supreme Court cases also recognized the speech value of
47
citizen-to-citizen leafleting. In Lovell v. City of Griffin, the Court
voided an ordinance banning distribution of literature in public
places without a permit, holding that the freedom of the press
39. 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
40. Id. at 160.
41. See id. at 160-61 (noting that legislation may regulate some aspects of the
conduct of individuals using the street to disseminate information as long as it does
not “abridge [their] constitutional liberty”).
42. See id. at 161 (ruling that courts, whenever considering a regulation abridging
speech rights in a public forum, “should be astute to examine the effect of the
challenged legislation”).
43. See id. at 160-64 (emphasizing the importance of public forum free speech
rights).
44. See id. at 163 (“[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.”).
45. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (noting that considerations
such as efficiency and convenience for law enforcement officials do not justify
diminishing freedom of speech).
46. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2432 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the court applies strict scrutiny to contentbased regulations of speech); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show
its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.”).
47. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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embraces the distribution of leaflets: “[l]iberty of circulating is as
essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the
48
circulation, the publication would be of little value.” The Schneider
court described pamphlets and leaflets as “historical weapons in the
defense of liberty” which have “proved most effective instruments in
49
the dissemination of opinion.”
The Court’s solicitude towards public forum speech rights at the
dawn of the free speech era reflected its understanding that
democracy requires freedom of political communication in public
spaces. Justice Roberts noted in Hague that “[c]itizenship of the
United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry
with it the right to discuss [public policy] and the benefits,
50
advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.” The
Court in Schneider declared public forum speech rights to be among
51
those “vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.” These
rights, it said, lie “at the foundation of free government by free men”
because the “streets are natural and proper places for the
52
dissemination of information and opinion.”
Private employers
might own the factories in Jersey City, but Mayor Hague does not own
the street.
In the following decades, the Court reaffirmed its embrace of the
public forum as a safe haven for free expression and a germinator of
53
democratic change. While recognizing that the state may have a
valid interest in regulating harmful non-speech conduct in public
fora, such as obstruction of passage on sidewalks, the Court has made
clear that, as a general rule, “[f]reedom of press [and] freedom of
54
speech . . . are in a preferred position.” The decisions establish that,
in democracy, speech is primary and logically prior to other state
interests. An incumbent majority cannot restrain political debate
48. Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
49. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162, 164.
50. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939).
51. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
52. Id. at 161, 163.
53. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988) (overturning a federal law
restricting the display of signs near foreign embassies); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (invalidating a law prohibiting leafleting and the display of signs
on sidewalks near the U.S. Supreme Court); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
238 (1963) (overturning breach of peace convictions of protesters who were
demonstrating on state house grounds); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60
(1948) (invalidating a law banning use of sound amplification devices in public
places without a city permit); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943)
(holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of
literature); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (invalidating an ordinance
prohibiting leafleting on city streets).
54. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
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under the guise of protecting the values of consensus, civility, or
social peace. As the Court in Martin v. City of Struthers stated, the
“authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and
unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose
to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
55
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.”
Elaborating further in a case overturning the conviction of civil rights
protesters for breach of the peace, the Court in Edwards v. South
Carolina declared that the “maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
56
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”
Unfortunately, the Hill decision marks a dramatic downward
departure from this core First Amendment tradition defining
democracy as rooted in a boundless speech ethic in public fora. In
Hill, the majority cavalierly dethroned free political speech from its
preeminent constitutional position in the public forum and
subordinated it to newly conjured and ill-defined values of listener
privacy and solitude. It can only be hoped that this sudden erosion
of public forum speech rights will be remembered as a flash-in-thepan aberration based on the liberal justices’ passing irritation with
the aggressive tactics of the anti-abortion movement rather than a
doctrinal turning point that sends the First Amendment back to its
57
strong property ownership roots in the common law.
II. HILL V. COLORADO
A. The Colorado Statute
58

In 1993, the Colorado legislature enacted a law expressly
intended to prevent the “willful obstruction of a person’s access to
59
To achieve this objective,
medical counseling and treatment.”
Section 2 of the statute made it a criminal offense to “knowingly
55. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
56. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (quoting Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See McGinnis, supra note 4, at 57 (taking an optimistic view of a return to a
property-based vision of the First Amendment).
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (2000) (prohibiting certain types of
communication within eight feet of an unconsenting individual who is within 100
feet of a health care facility).
59. Id. § 18-9-122(1).

RASKINPP

190

1/24/02 5:59 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:179

obstruct[], detain[], hinder[], impede[], or block[] another person’s
60
entry to or exit from a health care facility.” Section 3, however, went
far beyond this ban on actually blocking entry and exit, and made it a
crime for any person:
[to] knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such
person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in
the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet
61
from any entrance door to a health care facility.

The statute effectively banned handbilling in this zone because of
the impossibility of handing another person a leaflet at a distance of
62
eight feet. The statute also eliminated or severely hindered much
conversational speech because it is very difficult to speak to someone
in a conversational tone at eight feet with ambient street noise and
63
other nearby distractions. The purpose of the statute was to build a
kind of bubble around people walking to and from health facilities
and a corresponding straitjacket around those who would think of
approaching and talking to them.
While Section 2 of the statute directly addressed conduct—physical
obstruction of access to health care facilities—Section 3 criminalized
64
pure speech activities.
The state justified Section 3 as a
“prophylactic” regulation which prevented unruly demonstrators
from engaging in unlawful, non-speech conduct by discouraging
them from knowingly getting close enough to patients and staff to
65
commit such conduct. In its brief, the state contended that recent
demonstrations outside health care facilities involved kicking,
punching, blocking, intimidating, threatening, and “crowding”
60. Id. § 18-9-122(2); see also id. § 18-9-122(4) (defining a “health care facility” as
any entity authorized “to administer medical treatment in” Colorado). According to
the Colorado Attorney General, the statute did not apply, however, to the offices of
dentists, chiropractors, or optometrists. See Brief for Respondents at *11 n.9, Hill v.
Colorado, 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1856 (No. 98-1856) (Dec. 10, 1999) (citing COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-106 (West 1999)).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(6)
(subjecting any person violating the act to civil liability).
62. See id. § 18-9-122(3) (prohibiting a person from coming within eight feet of
an individual who is within 100 feet of the entrance of a health care facility to engage
in leafleting, oral communication, or the exhibition of signs).
63. Id.
64. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2000) (stating that it is “clear and
undisputed” that the plaintiffs’ leafleting, oral communications, and sign displays,
which are prohibited by Section 3, are speech activities “protected by the First
Amendment”).
65. See Brief for Respondents at *1-*3, Hill (No. 98-1856) (noting that without
the statute, demonstrators were likely to “continue to crowd and surround patients”
making intimidation “inevitable” and access to the facility problematic).
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patients and staff, as well as spitting and “intrusive” or “in-your-face”
66
approaches and protesting. This kind of activity not only physically
prevented or discouraged some patients from entering facilities,
thereby delaying their health care, the state said, but substantially
increased their stress levels, which could complicate medical
67
treatment and increase the risks associated with surgical procedures.
Without much elaboration, the state argued that simply relying on
Section 2 or other general laws against harassment and assault would
be ineffectual, primarily because these laws would be “more difficult
68
to enforce” in crowd situations.
Colorado acknowledged that the substance of the protestors’
69
speech was often perceived by legislators as “offensive,” but
contended that Section 3 was not targeted at the content of the
speech. Rather, the state said, the provision was a constitutionally
valid, content and viewpoint-neutral regulation of the place and
manner of this speech that complied with the Supreme Court
70
specifications in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.
Under Ward, a
government may impose reasonable regulations on the time, place,
and manner of speech, provided the restrictions are “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
71
information.” Colorado argued that, in addition to meeting the
66. Id. at *1-*4, *12-*13. According to the brief, the term “in your face”
protesting referred to things like protesters coming “inches away from people’s
faces,” id. at *13, messages delivered at “extremely close range,” id. at *19, and
“thrusting signs and leaflets into faces” or cars, id. at *1, *13.
67. Id. at *10 (emphasizing the state’s interest in “protecting [the] health” of its
citizens).
68. Id. at *3-*4. It is not clear why it would be harder for police to determine
whether protestors were obstructing or harassing people in a crowd situation than it
would be to determine if a demonstrator crossed the eight foot threshold without
consent in a crowd situation. The statute does not prohibit “crowding” as long as
demonstrators do not block ingress and egress, and they remain at least eight feet
from another person without consent. Interestingly, the state said that the
legislature had considered a revision to its general harassment law to address the
problem, but that it declined this alternative because it was more difficult to enforce
and “possibly impermissibly content-based.” Id. at *4. The state did not explain how
such a legislative approach would be content-based, especially if it applied generally.
69. See Brief for Respondents at *19, Hill (No. 98-1856) (noting that the
Colorado legislature discussed the “extremely offensive terms,” such as “murderer,”
used by demonstrators); see also id. at *24 (“[T]he legislature heard descriptions of
demonstrations that were highly offensive in . . . their content . . . .”).
70. 491 U.S. 781, 802-03 (1989) (finding that the city’s desire to control noise in
order to return the sedate character of the park has nothing to do with content, and
therefore, the challenged guideline was content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve
legitimate governmental interests, and left open alternative channels of
communication).
71. Id. at 791.
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other elements of the Ward test, the statute was aimed at obstruction,
crowding, and threatening conduct; it did not reference the content
of any speech; and it applied generally to any “health care facility”
and to any group, including “pro-choice, animal rights, or anti72
Medicaid demonstrators.”
B. Litigation and the High Court’s Ruling
Shortly after enactment, a group of anti-abortion demonstrators
filed suit in state court contending that Section 3 of the statute was
73
facially invalid and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. The
plaintiffs were citizens who believed that “many women who abort
their children do so because no one has offered them information
74
about alternatives to abortion.”
They described themselves as
“sidewalk counselors” who offered information about alternatives to
75
abortion to women near abortion clinics. They stated that their
76
counseling and education efforts involved the use of leaflets, signs,
conversation, and a model of an unborn child at ten weeks gestation,
and that in some cases these efforts succeeded in converting
77
pregnant women to their point of view. The plaintiffs’ activities
occurred within eight feet of other persons, and they alleged that,
based on their experience, it would be difficult to accomplish the feat
of simultaneously remaining on the sidewalks or public ways, staying
eight feet from any person not granting consent to their approach,
and conducting their conversational and political leafleting
78
activities. They further stated that they did not engage in dangerous
79
or harassing conduct as part of their speech activities. After the
statute was enacted, the plaintiffs, out of fear of criminal prosecution,
either suspended their activities or curbed them in a way that
72. Brief for Respondents at *18-*19, Hill (No. 98-1856).
73. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2485 (describing that the complaint alleged violations of
the right to free speech protected by the First Amendment and the right to a free
press by impairing the right to distribute written materials).
74. Brief for Petitioners at *2, Hill v. Colorado, 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1856 (No.
98-1856) (Nov. 10, 1999).
75. See id. (describing “sidewalk counseling” as a means for petitions to educate
others about abortion alternatives).
76. Signs used by the plaintiffs included messages like “Abortion Kills Children”
or photographs of aborted fetuses. See id. at *3.
77. See id. at *2-*4 (describing how, through petitioner’s various efforts, women
headed to abortion clinics allegedly changed their minds after speaking with
petitioners).
78. See id. at *3 (drawing conclusion based on the petitioner’s experiences as
sidewalk counselors).
79. See id. (“The Colorado Supreme Court assumed for the purposes of deciding
the case below, ‘that petitioners have not engaged in, and do not intend to engage
in, such dangerous and harassing conduct.’”).

RASKINPP

2001]

1/24/02 5:59 PM

DISFAVORED SPEECH ABOUT FAVORED RIGHTS

193

80

undermined their effectiveness.
81
The plaintiffs lost in both the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
82
Supreme Court of Colorado. In their appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs, now petitioners, challenged Section 3 of the
statute on the following grounds: content and viewpoint
discrimination; insufficiently narrow tailoring; failure to leave open
ample alternative channels of communication; imposition of a prior
83
84
restraint; overbreadth; and vagueness. With regard to content and
viewpoint discrimination, the petitioners claimed first that Section 3
was content-based because protest, education, and counseling are
85
categories of speech. They argued that liability under the statute
turned on an examination of whether their speech fell into one of
these categories as opposed to an unrestricted and permissible
86
category like a salutation or greeting.
The petitioners also
contended that the statute was discriminatory because it effectively
gave listeners unbridled discretion to grant or deny a speaker
permission to approach for speech purposes based on their dislike of
87
the content or viewpoint of their speech.
The Court rejected the petitioners’ claims, including those
88
involving content and viewpoint discrimination. The Court framed
its analysis by discussing the interests it perceived to be at stake in the
case: the petitioners’ interest in free speech, the state’s interest in
protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and, most curiously of
80. See Brief for Petitioners at *4, Hill (No. 98-1856) (noting that the statute’s
enactment directly prohibits conduct that interferes with access to facilities, which
hinders or prevents petitioners from conducting their activities).
81. See Hill v. City of Lakewood, 949 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the Colorado statute complied with all elements of the Ward test for
time, place, and manner restrictions).
82. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1259 (Colo. 1999) (affirming the decision
of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Hill v. City of Lakewood).
83. The rather powerful prior restraint argument was that the statute delegated
to listeners in the public forum the unbridled authority and discretion to restrict in
advance the speech of anyone beginning to approach them within eight feet. See
Brief for Petitioners at *10-*11, Hill (No. 98-1856).
84. See id. (articulating each of the plaintiffs’ grounds of appeal).
85. See id. at *10 (stating that distributing leaflets displaying signs, and orally
educating, counseling, or protesting are protected forms of expression—and by
enacting such a statute, petitioners claim that Colorado is attempting to regulate
their exercise of core constitutional rights of expression).
86. See id. at *31-*32 (urging that the statute be subject to strict scrutiny because
it is the content of the speech that determines whether it is within the statute’s
prohibition) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
87. See id. at *33 (providing examples of how the Colorado statute discriminates
based upon content or viewpoint).
88. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2483 (finding that the Colorado statute passes the Ward
test and also noting that the statute is a regulation of places where speech may occur,
as opposed to being a regulation of speech).
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all, a listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication. The
Court claimed that this last interest derived from the “right to be let
90
alone” discussed by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, from
the privacy interest recognized in speech cases involving private
91
residences, and from a most surprising eighty-year-old labor case
which held that if an offer to communicate is declined by a speaker,
“persistence, importunity, following and dogging, become
92
unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction . . . .” However, the Court
denied that it was recognizing a new listener’s “right” to avoid
93
unwanted speech in a public forum.
Rather, it was “merely”
recognizing an “interest” in “situations where the degree of captivity
94
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer . . . to avoid exposure.”
The majority presumably concluded that medical facility patients and
staff walking down the sidewalk experienced some degree of
95
“captivity.”
C. The Court’s Content and Viewpoint Analysis
In First Amendment jurisprudence, “content is a spacious concept
that embraces whole subjects of discourse regardless of the
96
‘viewpoint’ expressed.” It has been defined variously as the “subject
97
98
99
matter,” a “topic,” or a “category” of speech.
The term
89. See id. at 2488-89 (mentioning that when conducting this interest analysis, it is
necessary to recognize the great difference between state restrictions on a speaker’s
right to address a willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted
communication).
90. See id. at 2489-90 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
91. See id. at 2490 (adding that this right to avoid unwelcome speech derives
special force from cases that involve the privacy of the home and its immediate
surroundings) (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738
(1970)).
92. Id. (citing Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
204 (1921)).
93. See id. (clarifying that past Supreme Court cases have recognized the rights of
unwilling listeners in certain situations).
94. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 209 (1975)).
95. See id. (recognizing that freedom to communicate is a substantial right, but
that the right of every individual “to be let alone” must be placed alongside the right
of others to communicate; because there are situations where “the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure,” courts
have recognized the need to protect the interests of the unwilling listeners).
96. Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 101
(1996).
97. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2493 (noting that in an earlier case, the court found
content discrimination where a regulation gave preferential treatment to only “one
particular subject matter”); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (contrasting discrimination based on the “subject matter” of
speech with that based on the viewpoint of the speech); Erwin Chemerinsky, The First
Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
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“viewpoint” refers to “one’s opinion, judgment, or position” within
100
the subject matter, topic, or category. As these definitions indicate,
“[v]iewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content
discrimination” and thus, logically, a subset of content
101
102
discrimination.
Although “the distinction is not a precise one”
and the two concepts often merge and intersect, the distinction is
one that the Court continues to apply, albeit with varying degrees of
103
consistency and difficulty.
As noted above, the threshold question for application of the Ward
test is whether the time, place, and manner regulation at issue is
104
content-neutral (and therefore, by extension, viewpoint-neutral).
For if a regulation of speech is deemed content-based, strict scrutiny
is triggered, and the state must demonstrate that the regulation
serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to
105
promote that interest. The strict scrutiny standard also requires the
state to use the regulatory alternative that is least restrictive of
106
If, however, the regulation is content-neutral, then it will
speech.
be considered under the Ward test, which involves a substantially less
199, 202-03 (1994) (differentiating viewpoint neutral from subject matter neutral
government regulation; subject matter neutral means that government cannot
regulate speech based on the topic of speech).
98. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (describing content as a
category that includes not only viewpoints but “discussion of an entire topic”); Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (stating that content-based regulation, and hostility
toward such regulation, extends to prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic).
99. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (referring to content as “an entire
category of speech”).
100. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3.02(2)(c)(i), at 3-20 (1994) (quoting Amato v.
Wilentz, 753 F. Supp. 543, 553 (D.N.J. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(describing “viewpoint” as the “particular views taken by speakers on a subject”).
101. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; see also SMOLLA, supra note 100, § 3.02(2)(c)(i), at
3-18 (“Viewpoint discrimination is a subset of content discrimination; all viewpoint
discrimination is first content discrimination . . .”).
102. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
103. See Heins, supra note 96, at 101 (pointing out that the court has sometimes
confused the matter by using the terms “content” and “viewpoint” interchangeably).
104. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (setting forth the
three-part test for judging the constitutionality of a government’s regulation of time,
place, and manner of protected speech).
105. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (2000)
(finding that the distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is a
matter of degree, and thus, the government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the
same rigorous scrutiny as content-based bans); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988) (stating that a content-based restriction on speech in a public forum must be
subjected to the “most exacting scrutiny”).
106. See Playboy Entm’t Group, 120 S. Ct. at 1886 (stating that if a less restrictive
alternative to regulating speech based on content exists, and it serves the
government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative).

RASKINPP

196

1/24/02 5:59 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:179

107
rigorous form of scrutiny. Under Ward, the government need only
108
show a significant government interest, not a compelling one. And
while Ward also contains a narrow tailoring requirement, it does not
require that the government deploy the least restrictive regulatory
109
alternative.
Rather, the state can satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement “so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
110
regulation.” This weaker standard means that the state can select a
regulation that burdens more speech than other available regulatory
alternatives, provided the selected regulation is not “substantially
111
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest . . . .”
Thus, the content neutrality analysis will be the critical doctrinal
crossroads when a plaintiff challenges a speech restriction that the
112
government claims to be only a time, place, and manner restriction.
In Hill, the Court found that Section 3 was content-neutral and
governed by the more relaxed Ward test, making it much easier for
the statute to survive the petitioners’ challenges on narrow tailoring
113
and perhaps the separate but related overbreadth issue. The Court
began its content neutrality analysis by stating that the “principal
inquiry” was “whether the government has adopted a regulation of
114
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” The
115
First, the
Court answered the question with three general points.
Court declared that Section 3 was not a regulation of speech, but only
116
a “regulation of the places where some speech may occur.” Second,
it concluded that Section 3 was not adopted because of any
disagreement by the Colorado legislature with any messages conveyed

107. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (noting that government regulation is content
neutral provided that it is “justified without reference to the content of regulated
speech”).
108. See id. (allowing for the government to impose reasonable restrictions so long
as such restrictions do not reference the content of the speech) (citing Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
109. See id. at 798 (stating that a time, place, and manner restriction must be
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest, but “it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so”).
110. Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
112. See id. at 797 (noting that the less-restrictive-alternative analysis has never
been part of the time, place, and manner inquiry).
113. In its discussion of overbreadth, the Court makes repeated references to its
analysis of the scope of the statute under the Ward test. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S.
Ct. 2480, 2497 (2000).
114. Id. at 2491 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
115. See id. (noting how the Colorado statute passes the Ward test).
116. Id.
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117

by affected speech.
The Court rested this conclusion on the fact
that the Colorado courts reviewing the statute and its legislative
history determined that the “restrictions apply equally to all
demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language
118
makes no reference to the content of the speech.”
And finally, it
said that a regulation is content-neutral if it is “justified without
119
reference to the content of regulated speech.” Here, it found that
the state’s expressed interests underlying the statute—protecting
health and safety by securing access—were unrelated to the content
120
of the demonstrators’ speech.
The Court dismissed the petitioners’ argument that the statute’s
selective application to oral protest, education, and counseling made
121
it content-based. This argument, based on Carey v. Brown, pointed
out that the content of the speech would have to be examined by a
court in order to determine whether it came within the statute’s
categorical restrictions. The statute, from this vantage point, was all
about content. But the majority held that courts often review,
without constitutional problems, the content of certain speech, such
as possible threats, blackmail, or an agreement to fix prices, in order
122
to determine whether a law applies to a course of conduct.
The
Court conceded that, in the context of Section 3, it may be necessary
to review the content of speech to ensure that punishment is not
123
imposed for greetings and other innocuous social communications.
The Court, however, cited several precedents which purportedly
upheld the regulation of broad categories of speech comparable to
124
Moreover, the Court
protest, education, and counseling speech.
117. See id. (finding that the statute applies equally to all demonstrators, and the
statutory language makes no reference to the content of speech).
118. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2491 (citing Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1256 (Colo.
1999)).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 2493 (restating that the Colorado statute places no restrictions on
either viewpoint or subject matter; rather it represents a minor place restriction on a
broad category of communications).
121. 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980) (holding that because “it is the content of speech
that determines whether [the regulation] is within or without the statute’s blunt
prohibition[,]” the statute is content-based).
122. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2492 (speculating that under the Colorado statute, one
would rarely need to know the exact words spoken in order to determine whether
speech constitutes protest or purely social conversation).
123. See id. (stating that regulation of activities such as demonstrating and
picketing does not include social, random, or other ordinary conversation).
124. See id. at 2492 n.30 (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
753 (1994) (upholding an injunction that prohibited demonstrating); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 474 (1988) (upholding a ban on residential picketing); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 n.10 (1983) (upholding as content-neutral a statute
that prohibited picketing and leafleting but not other expressive conduct); Police
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972) (stating that picketing may be
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said that Carey dealt with a statute that banned all picketing except
labor picketing at places of employment, and therefore the
125
regulation in Carey was clearly content-based. By contrast, Section 3
applied to any form of protest, education, and counseling, whether
spoken by anti-abortion, pro-choice, or animal rights protestors; and
126
it only established, the Court held, a “minor place restriction” on
the speech of any demonstrators, and only for the purpose of
127
preventing harassment and protecting access.
Justice Kennedy argued in dissent that Section 3 was content-based
because it applied only to areas around “health care facilities,” which
was a euphemism for abortion clinics, the principal target area of
128
protest, education, and counseling by anti-abortion activists.
The
majority attempted to rebut this point by invoking the example of
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,129 where the
Court upheld a regulation banning solicitation in airports, an area
frequently used for solicitation by the Hare-Krishnas.
Justice
Kennedy also raised the more general concern that the whole
purpose and design of the statute was to target the speech of anti130
abortion protestors. The majority, however, replied that the fact
that an “enactment [i]s motivated by the conduct of the partisans on
131
one side of a debate” does not make it content or viewpoint-based.
Finally, the Court concluded its content neutrality analysis by arguing
that just as anti-abortion protesters would have to seek permission for
an approach to hand someone a leaflet or speak to them about
132
abortion, so too would a pro-choice activist.
regulated)).
125. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (maintaining that although subject matter
regulation was not as obnoxious as viewpoint regulation, it was still objectionable).
126. Id. at 2493.
127. See id. (arguing that the purpose of the statute is to protect people who enter
health care facilities from harassment arising from an unwelcome approach by
someone who may want to engage in confrontational dialogue).
128. See id. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the statute is
unmistakably content-based because it only restricts speech around health care
facilities which in practice will target a narrow range of topics).
129. 505 U.S. 672, 672 (1992) (emphasizing that regulations pertaining to
expressive activity conducted on government property that is not a traditional or
designated public forum must only be reasonable in order to survive constitutional
scrutiny).
130. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s refusal to view the targeting of speech outside of medical facilities is
cloaked content regulation).
131. Id. at 2494. The Court cited Frisby v. Schultz for this proposition, a case
involving a ban on residential picketing that was prompted by anti-abortion protests
outside a doctor’s home. See Frisby, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (examining the wording
of the statute and not the motive behind the legislation in order to determine
whether the statute is content neutral).
132. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasizing a close scrutiny of the statute’s text,
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III. INVITING DISCRIMINATION
Given the more relaxed standard of review for a content-neutral
regulation under Ward, the threshold content neutrality
determination is obviously the linchpin of a time, place, and manner
133
case like Hill. If a court is too easily seduced by the facially neutral
aspects of a statute, the likelihood of that statute surviving judicial
scrutiny will increase markedly, and speech will be less free for the
politically weak, the controversial, the marginal, and all those who
134
depend on public fora to communicate.
In Hill, the majority fell
head over heels for the seductive Colorado statute. The majority’s
analysis, however, fails to stand on its own terms. The majority
suppressed essential free speech principles that would have ensured
far more rigorous scrutiny of new limitations on expression in the
public forum. It also ignored or dismissed abundant evidence of the
content and viewpoint-based character of Section 3. As a result,
governments now have a legislative blueprint for restricting the kinds
of speech they want to suppress in public spaces.
A. The Interest of the “Unwilling Listener” as a Potential Viewpoint-Neutral
Government Motivation
Although the majority insisted that it was recognizing only a
constitutional interest, not a constitutional right, that the unwilling
listener has to avoid unwelcome speech in a public forum, the Court
accorded this novel “interest” sufficient weight to justify balancing it
against the constitutional bedrock of free speech rights in the public
135
forum.
Consequently, the state’s interest in protecting the
unwilling listener becomes an effective tool for government to reduce
136
the speech rights of disfavored groups or individuals.
The majority’s newly minted “interest of the unwilling listener”
which does not call for restriction of speech on a specific topic but rather only
restricts the broad category of oral protest, education, and counseling).
133. See id. (emphasizing that while time, place, or manner restrictions must be
narrowly tailored to serve government interests that are legitimate and content
neutral, they do not need to be the least restrictive means of doing so) (citing Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 783, 789 (1989)).
134. See infra Part IV (discussing the need for an objective approach to viewpoint
and content-based analysis).
135. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2488-90 (maintaining that while the right to free speech
offers protection for offensive speech, that protection does not condone such
offensive speech when it is so intrusive that the unwilling listener is unable to avoid
it).
136. This is an especially ironic result given that the State of Colorado explicitly
repudiated the unwilling listener interest in the case. See id. at 2507-08 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that the state not only explicitly disclaimed the unwilling
listener interest in its brief but characterized it as a “‘straw interest’ petitioners served
up in the hope of discrediting the State’s case.”) (emphasis omitted).
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rests on a wobbly precedential foundation, as the dissenters in Hill
137
perceived.
To begin with, the majority refers to Olmstead as an
example of the Court’s recognition of a right to be let alone, but cites
to Justice Brandeis’ dissenting opinion, which involved Fourth, not
138
First, Amendment interests.
Justice Brandeis was focused on
“unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
139
individual,” not the problem of citizens bothering one another with
speech in public places. Likewise, the First Amendment was not even
140
at issue in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,
the dubious old labor case about the Clayton Act that cavalierly
elevated, in dicta, the harms of union supporters “following and
141
dogging” other citizens.
Amazingly, the Hill Court goes even
further than the 1921 American Steel Foundries Court, which only
allowed for injunctions against picketers after the first face-to-face
approach:
We are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an
inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss
information with a view to influencing the other’s action are not
regarded as aggression or a violation of that other’s rights. If,
however, the offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then persistence,
importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable
annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of
142
intimidation.

Thus, even this 1901 Supreme Court, exhibiting pre-modern First
Amendment consciousness, perceived that the law cannot obstruct
137. See id. at 2508 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing one authority relied on by
the majority as a “slim reed” which “contradicts rather than supports the Court’s
position”); see also id. at 2519 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In a further glaring
departure from precedent we learn today that citizens have a right to avoid
unpopular speech in a public forum.”).
138. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“To protect [the right to be let alone], every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual . . . must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). The case involved the constitutional
propriety of government wiretapping of private telephones. See id. at 456-57, 466.
139. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
140. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
141. Id. at 204. Even if American Steel Foundries had involved the First Amendment
and established a valid limitation on free speech activity, its relevance in Hill would
be questionable at best. The Colorado statute’s proscription went well beyond
“following and dogging.” Under the statute, a wholly peaceful and respectful
protester, who neither followed nor said anything after another person declined to
accept a leaflet or conversation, would be just as liable as a protester who “followed
and dogged” the unresponsive subject of an approach. Id. at 203. The sole trigger of
liability under the statute is the mere act of approaching another person within eight
feet without consent for the purpose of exercising long-recognized free speech
rights. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2484.
142. Am. Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added).
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speech encounters among citizens in the first instance but can
interfere only when the engagement begins to move down the road
to stalking, which is a far cry from the encounters banned by Section
3 of the statute in the Hill case.
In any event, both Olmstead and American Steel Foundries date from
the 1920s, a period before the development of the public forum
doctrine when the Supreme Court’s modern First Amendment
143
jurisprudence came into being. Nor do the later precedents cited
by the majority provide much, if any, additional support for the
144
proposition. The “degree of captivity” reference, for instance, was
145
pulled from Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, but was based on the
146
language of an earlier case which did not involve a public forum
and in which the Court was making the point that passengers on a
city bus face a much higher “degree of captivity” than “a person on
147
the street.” In fact, the Erznoznik Court struck down an ordinance
prohibiting the showing of nudity on drive-in movie screens visible
from a public street, and held that “the Constitution does not permit
government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are
sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling
148
listener.” Other cases relied on by the Hill majority concerned the
unique privacy interests of the home or its immediate surroundings,
an area categorically distinguishable from public parks and sidewalks
149
in commercial districts.
143. See supra pp. 185-89 and accompanying notes (providing an historical
timeline detailing the development of the public forum doctrine).
144. The Court contended that it was merely recognizing the interest of the
unwilling listener in situations where the “degree of captivity makes it impractical for
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.” Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2490 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S 205,
209 (1975)).
145. 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975) (indicating that government restrictions
intended to shield the public from certain speech can only be upheld upon showing
an invasion of substantial privacy interests).
146. The earlier case discussed by the Erznoznik court was Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, in which the plurality stated that “[n]o First Amendment forum is here to be
found.” Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
147. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210 n.5.
148. Id. at 210.
149. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (“One important aspect of
residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations,
we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear . . . the home
is different.”) (emphasis added); see also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“That we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech . . . does not mean we must be captives
everywhere.”). Rowan and Frisby were key cases relied on by the majority in Hill to
support its “unwilling listener” theory. Whatever the intrinsic merits of these
decisions, they at least have some plausible constitutional basis in the Third and
Fourth Amendments’ sanctification of privacy in the home. The Hill decision takes
the residential privacy idea and runs all the way downtown with it.
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The Court’s surprising identification of the unwilling listener
interest as a strong potential counterweight to traditional public
150
forum free speech rights is a most troubling development, but also
puzzling in its doctrinal ramifications. It is unclear whether the
unwilling listener balancing test is independent and supplemental to,
or fully integrated in, the established First Amendment tests like that
151
of Ward.
In Hill, the “unwilling listener” paradigm seemed to
change the overall analysis and outcome of the case, and it likely
influenced the Court’s views as it applied the significant
152
governmental interest prong of the Ward test. But the exact logical
connection is not self-evident from the text of the case. One
possibility is that the majority views the new interest in being left
alone as a content and viewpoint-neutral motivation for government
speech regulations. If so, this interest is a little dagger aimed at the
very heart of the First Amendment because it is hard to see how the
right to speak freely in public places can coexist with an equally
weighty interest in being left alone in public places.
In this sense, Hill does for abortion-related speech in public places
153
what Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes did for
political discourse during election campaigns: it allows political
forces with state power to tilt the market in speech to favor
154
reproduction of their hegemony in ideas and beliefs. In Forbes, the
majority upheld as non-viewpoint discriminatory the exclusion of an
Independent candidate for Congress from a state-run and taxpayer-

150. An unwilling listener balancing test, in which the unwilling listener’s interest
in avoiding unwanted speech is balanced against the First Amendment rights of
public forum speakers, could have broad and severe consequences for free speech in
the public forum. For example, the typical worker faces at least as high a “degree of
captivity” on the sidewalks and streets near his place of employment as a patient
seeking medical care. Thus, the unwilling listener interest might be used in a future
case to justify restrictions on labor unions or other demonstrations near the
entrances of plants and office buildings.
151. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2489-90 (2000) (discussing the line of
precedent that has recognized the interests of unwilling listeners); see also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 783, 792 (1989) (recognizing as legitimate the
restraints imposed on musical performance for the purposes of avoiding “undue
intrusion” into the area).
152. See id. (finding that the statute was advancing the state’s interest in protecting
unwilling listeners and protecting the health and safety of citizens); see also Ward, 491
U.S. at 791 (stating that a government’s interest is justified as long as it is unrelated
to the content of the speech that the government is attempting to regulate).
153. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
154. See id. (holding that a state-owned public television broadcaster’s decision to
exclude an electoral candidate from participation in debate, which thereby
perpetuated the traditional two-party electoral system, did not violate the candidate’s
First Amendment rights because the debate was a non-public forum and the decision
was well within the journalist’s discretion).
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155

subsidized cable network’s televised candidate debate.
The Court
found that keeping the Independent out of the debate was
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral because the state television
156
network’s staff determined that he was not “viable.” Yet the viability
screen for participation in government-run debates is simply a
statement that certain candidates and their platforms are not
sufficiently popular and, therefore, in the unscientific view of the
157
government, the majority of people do not want to hear them. Similarly,
the Court’s constitutionalization of an interest in being left alone
against unwanted speech in public places is a statement by the Court
that if certain political or moral views are unpopular and the majority
of people do not want to hear them, speeech may then be censored or
158
regulated by the government in affected areas.
Both of these
holdings are at odds with the notion that the First Amendment
159
protects unpopular speech.
B. Dismissive and Insubstantial Responses to Petitioners’ Arguments
The petitioners claimed that Section 3 was impermissibly contentbased because protest, education, and counseling are all types of
160
protected speech content.
As the Court noted, the petitioners
161
modeled this claim largely on Carey v. Brown’s statement that if the
content of the speech is what determines whether liability is imposed,
162
The petitioners reasoned that a
the regulation is content-based.
fact finder applying Section 3 would have to evaluate the speech in
155. See id. at 674 (arguing that a broadcaster is charged with the task of choosing
amongst viewpoints in order to serve a public interest and that such a choice is not
considered viewpoint discrimination in the constitutional sense).
156. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding
that a government-owned television station could exclude a legally qualified
candidate from the debate simply because he was not deemed to be a “viable”
candidate).
157. See id. at 682 (upholding candidate’s exclusion based on the stated reason for
exclusion being his inability to generate adequate public support).
158. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2517-18 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority’s decision gives citizens the right to avoid unpopular
speech and sanctions the government’s categorical restriction on certain speech in a
public forum).
159. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”).
160. See id. at 2483 (discussing petitioners’ position that the statute required
examination of content and that their freedom of speech, press, and peaceable
assembly were violated).
161. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
162. See id. at 462 (reiterating the Court’s previous holding that an ordinance
regulating free speech cannot prohibit an activity only because it involves specific
subject matter).
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order to screen out pleasantries, greetings, requests for directions, or
other unrestricted speech from restricted speech like protests or
163
counseling, thereby triggering the Carey rule.
Interestingly, the
majority, at least initially, admitted that this kind of content review
164
But then the Court
would have to take place under Section 3.
moved to negate the force of its admission by arguing that protest,
education, and counseling do not fit under the definition of
165
content.
The majority’s analogy to the judicial review of speech
166
content in blackmail or price fixing cases is ultimately unpersuasive
because the speech constituting these unlawful schemes does not
167
However, oral protest,
receive First Amendment protection.
education, and counseling are clearly types of protected speech, as
168
They are, indeed, core forms of
the Court acknowledged.
protected speech activity. Thus, in Hill, it is the content of otherwise
protected speech which suddenly deprives it of constitutional
standing.
Next, the Court analogized protest, education, and counseling to
picketing and demonstrating, and cited cases upholding statutes that
regulated picketing and demonstrating but not other forms of speech
activity. But whatever the merits of those rather shaky decisions,
picketing and demonstrations are a “mixture of conduct and
169
communication,” as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent,
whereas Section 3 applies to strictly verbal protest, education, and
170
counseling.
A more illuminating analogy for the majority could
171
have been found in Burson v. Freeman, which dealt with a law
163. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2483 (responding to the Court’s assertion that the Court
has never held it improper to look at content in order to assess whether it falls under
a statute).
164. See id. at 2492 (stating that “cases may arise in which it is necessary to review
the content of the statements made by a person approaching within eight feet”).
165. See id. at 2493 (arguing that the statute does not qualify as content-based
regulation).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 122123 (discussing the comparison
between speech conducted in furtherance of criminal activity and advocacy).
167. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978)
(“The First Amendment does not make it . . . impossible ever to enforce laws against
agreements in restraint of trade . . .) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t has never
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”).
168. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2488 (“[Petitioners] correctly state that their leafleting,
sign displays, and oral communications are protected by the First Amendment.”).
169. See id. at 2504-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
170. See id. at 2504 n.1 (quoting the statutory language of “oral protest, education,
or counseling”).
171. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). Although the Court in Burson upheld the speech
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banning speech in a public place. There, the Court held that a
Tennessee law prohibiting any campaign activities within 100 feet of
the entrance of a polling place was a content-based restriction on the
172
category of “political speech.”
In the context of Section 3, oral
protest is inherently political speech as well. However much one may
dislike and want to refute anti-abortion activists, these activists are
attempting to dissuade women from exercising their constitutional
rights in a particular way and perhaps to persuade them to support a
change in public policy on abortion, both of which are
constitutionally protected speech activities.
The Court also argued that oral protest, education, and counseling
constitute neither a “subject matter,” unlike the law in Carey
distinguishing labor speech from non-labor speech, nor a particular
viewpoint, thereby reasoning that these forms of speech did not fit
173
within the definition of speech content. However, as Justice Scalia
said, the Court has “never held that the universe of content-based
174
regulations is limited to [subject matter and viewpoint] . . . .” The
Court’s own decisions have defined content more broadly. Burson
and Boos v. Barry explicitly state that “content” includes expansive
175
categories of speech such as political speech and commercial
176
speech. Oral protest, education, and counseling are types or forms of
177
speech defined by the attitudes and purposes of the speakers.
restrictions within 100 feet of a polling place, Burson does not support the Court’s
reasoning in Hill or contradict our argument. Id. at 191-92. Burson held that the
state law was content-based and strict scrutiny applied. Id. at 191. The Court then
found that the statute survived strict scrutiny. Id. In Hill, the Court held that a
comparable state law was not content-based and therefore not subject to strict
scrutiny. 120 S. Ct. at 2494. We argue that the Hill Court’s fundamental error was its
failure to recognize the content and viewpoint-based nature of the Colorado statute,
which resulted in application of the lesser standard of scrutiny for content-neutral
statutes under Ward. Id. While we do not believe that the Colorado statute should
pass muster under strict scrutiny, our key concern is that statutes such as Colorado’s
should be examined under the most stringent standard of review.
172. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
173. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2493-94 (dismissing Justice Kennedy’s theory that
restrictions on speech become content-based when they are applied to specific
locations where such speech takes place).
174. Id. at 2503-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 (describing speech content as including
“categories of speech” or “an entire topic” of speech); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
318-19 (1988) (holding that the anti-picketing statute at issue was content-based
because it prohibited “[o]ne category of speech” while permitting “[o]ther
categories of speech”).
176. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 197-98 (holding that the statute at issue was contentbased because it restricted “political” speech but did not “reach other categories of
speech, such as commercial solicitation, distribution, and display”).
177. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that when the
government regulates demonstrators and picketing, it is proscribing a manner of
expression).
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Surely a First Amendment that protects expressive conduct like flag
desecration must also protect the numerous types of verbal
expression, from protest, education, and counseling to heckling,
parody, commiseration, sarcasm, literary criticism, whispering, irony,
178
exhortation, advice-giving, prayer, diatribe, and so on.
The majority’s rejoinders to some of the key points made by Justice
Kennedy also lack substance and persuasive force. Justice Kennedy
pointed out that Section 3’s application only to the specific locations
favored by one group of protesters might be a sign that the statute
179
was effectively content and viewpoint-based. In response, the Court
180
alluded to International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee:
“[a] statute prohibiting solicitation in airports that was motivated by
aggressive approaches of Hari-Krishnas does not become content181
based solely because its application is confined to airports.”
But the comparison is inapposite. First, the Court in Lee decided
that the interior terminal area of an airport—the area subject to the
182
Consequently, the
regulation at issue—was a nonpublic forum.
majority opinion applied a mere reasonableness analysis, and, rightly
or wrongly, therefore did not have to address the issue of content (as
183
opposed to viewpoint) neutrality.
Second, the regulation did not
affect in any way the ability of the Hare-Krishnas to solicit on the
airport sidewalks outside the terminals that virtually all users of the
interior terminals would have to use as well, a fact that the Court in
Lee noted approvingly.184 In addition, the opinion contains no factual
information indicating that the Hare-Krishnas predominantly focused
their solicitation activity inside airports. On the contrary, Lee suggests
185
that they solicited in a variety of “public places.”
Moreover, the
Court, in a companion case, upheld the right of the Krishnas to
186
conduct leafleting inside the airport. Thus, the airport regulation
178. See id. (arguing that a regulation targeting poetry would be neither viewpoint
nor subject matter-specific but would still be content-based).
179. See id. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[The statute] applies only to a
special class of locations: entrances to buildings with health care facilities.”).
180. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
181. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2493-94.
182. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 680, 683 (explaining that airport terminals cannot be
considered a public forum because their main purpose is to service air travelers and
not serve as a center for the exchange of ideas).
183. See id. at 683-85 (arguing that because pedestrian congestion is a terminal
problem it is reasonable for airport authorities to limit solicitations to sidewalk areas
outside of terminals).
184. See id. at 684-85.
185. Id. at 674.
186. See Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992)
(holding that the Port Authority’s ban on the distribution of leaflets in airport
terminals was invalid under the First Amendment).
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in Lee does not create the clear impression, as exists in Hill, that the
whole purpose of the regulation was to restrict the speech activities of
a particular group engaged in a particular kind of speech.
187
The Court’s use of Frisby v. Schultz to rebut Justice Kennedy’s
point that the purpose and design of Section 3 was to restrict only
188
anti-abortion protesters fares better, but the situations in Frisby and
Hill remain distinguishable.
Frisby concerned an ordinance
prohibiting picketing in front of individual residences, and it did
appear that the ordinance was prompted by anti-abortion protests in
189
front of the home of a doctor. But the Court there did not perform
any kind of content neutrality analysis; rather, it accepted the state
190
courts’ findings of content neutrality without comment or question.
This inattention to content neutrality in Frisby makes some sense
given the unique nature of the picketing site considered in that case.
While the picketing undoubtedly took place in a public forum—
streets and sidewalks—this part of the forum abutted individually
191
targeted private homes.
Reflecting an acute sensitivity to this
universally shared kind of space—everyone lives somewhere—the
Court declared that the state’s interest in protecting the tranquility
192
and privacy of the home was of the “highest order” and there was
193
“no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.” It
also said that the speech activity was “narrowly directed at the
194
household, not the public,” and pointed out that all other areas of
195
the public forum remained unrestricted. Given the Court’s strong
language in favor of protecting the home and its emphasis on the
limited communicative potential of the speech, it is virtually certain
that the ordinance would have survived strict scrutiny had it been
used. The Court seemed disinclined to carefully evaluate an issue
that would have been immaterial to the outcome anyway.
187. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
188. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2517 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the “purpose and design” of the statute is to restrict only anti-abortion
protestors, as evidenced by the statute only applying to medical facilities).
189. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476 (noting that the ordinance was passed after
residents complained about the picketing).
190. See id. at 482 (stating that the Court is following its “normal practice” of
deferring to lower federal courts’ construction of a state statute because they are in a
better position to interpret the law of their respective jurisdictions).
191. See id. at 477 (determining that the ordinance was passed to protect private
homes from picketing and disturbances).
192. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445, 471 (1980)).
193. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 486.
195. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84 (determining that only picketing focused on a
particular residence is prohibited, and that alternatives such as marching through
neighborhoods, going door-to-door, distributing literature, and contacting residents
by telephone, still remain available).
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Responding to Justice Kennedy, the majority pointed out that prochoice activists (like anti-abortion activists) would have to seek
196
permission for person-to-person approaches. But the Court refused
to consider the relative improbability of patients or staff persons
entering a health care facility denying pro-choice activists the consent
to approach, much less having them arrested or prosecuted for their
speech activities. Even if a patient initially mistakes the pro-choice
activist for an abortion opponent and denies permission to speak and
approach, any interest in prosecution will vanish when it becomes
clear that the approaching person is friend, not foe.
The perfectly predictable viewpoint-skewed nature of face-to-face
contact in the new statutory regime tells us that there is something
fundamentally wrong with this statute. No one who ventures into
public space with a political message has a right to a friendly response
from his individual targets, but one at least thought a political
speaker would not face criminal prosecution for eliciting an
unfriendly response.
C. An Unduly Narrow Definition of “Discrimination”
An even more profound concern arises from the Court’s
understanding of “discrimination,” the other key component of the
concept of content or viewpoint discrimination. “Discrimination” is a
crucial conceptual yardstick for measuring the appropriateness of
197
government action.
If the term is defined too narrowly, the
speaker’s burden of proving that a regulation is content or viewpointbased increases substantially, and, in some cases, prohibitively.
In Hill, the Court appeared to use two definitions for
discrimination. First, the Court said that the “principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
198
message it conveys.” Second, the Court said that content neutrality
is shown if the regulation is “justified without reference to the content of
199
In applying at least the “justified without
the regulated speech.”
196. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 (2000) (stating Justice Kennedy’s
argument that the statute would only apply to the anti-abortion protestor fails
because the statute applies to all protestors and demonstrators, regardless of whether
they support abortion or not, or whether their protest even concerns abortion).
197. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “discrimination” as
“[t]he effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges on a certain class
or that denies privileges to a certain class . . . [d]ifferential treatment; esp., a failure
to treat all persons equally especially when no reasonable distinction can be found
between those favored and those not favored”).
198. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2491 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added)).
199. Id. (emphasis added).
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reference” language, the Court, alluding to the text of the statute,
stated that “[i]nstead of drawing distinctions based on the subject
that the approaching speaker may wish to address, the statute applies
equally” to any speaker within 100 feet of a health care facility,
200
regardless of the content or viewpoint of their speech. In addition,
the Court suggested that if a state’s expressed statutory objectives—
such as protecting patients and their access to health care facilities—
are facially unrelated to speech content, then the statute is justified
201
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.
The
Court thus assumed that, if the statutory text did not explicitly
“draw[] distinctions,” and if the state packaged the statute with
facially benign justifications, then the statute remained content
202
neutral.
It is not clear from the opinion whether the majority believed that
the “disagreement” definition requires an independent showing of
literal disagreement, or invidious subjective purpose, behind the
definition—the kind of showing the Forbes Court demanded of the
plaintiff in order to prove viewpoint discrimination in the decision to
203
exclude the Independent candidate in the race. If the definition of
discrimination does indeed require a showing of actual disagreement,
then the burden on the speaker will, in many cases, as in Forbes, be an
impossible one despite a perfectly clear content or viewpoint
204
distinction in the statute.
Such a construction would also
contradict existing precedent, which holds that in order to find
content or viewpoint discrimination, a court does not require
evidence that the legislature intended to suppress certain ideas
205
because of its disagreement with them.
200. Id. at 2493.
201. Id. at 2491 (determining the statute here passes this test for three reasons:
first, it is a regulation of places where speech occurs, not a regulation of speech;
second, it applies to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint; and third, the state’s
interest in protecting access and privacy in health care facilities is unrelated to the
content of the speech).
202. See id. at 2493.
203. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998)
(determining that due to the debate’s status as a nonpublic forum, the AETC could
exclude Forbes from the debate as long as it was not based on his viewpoint and it
was reasonable in light of AETC’s purpose).
204. See id. at 682 (agreeing with AETC’s reasons for excluding Forbes and finding
there was no viewpoint discrimination proven, and that Forbes was excluded because
of his own objective lack of support as a candidate).
205. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1991) (holding that a New York law intended to prevent
criminals from profiting by selling the story of their crimes was an invalid contentbased statute despite the fact that there was “no evidence of an improper censorial
motive” by the legislature) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
SMOLLA, supra note 100, § 3.02(2)(a)-(b) (discussing Simon & Schuster and arguing
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Even if “disagreement” is wholly superfluous, however, the Court,
in using a standard focused only on facially content-based statutes
and justifications, again replicated its error in Forbes. There, the
Court found that the exclusion of the Independent candidate from a
televised, government-run election debate was not viewpoint
discriminatory because it was not based on officially expressed
206
animosity towards his views. But the whole purpose and function of
excluding an Independent is to block off a political viewpoint based
on its perceived unpopularity. Surely a better understanding
appeared in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,207 where the Court found that the exclusion of religiouslyoriented student publications from the University of Virginia’s
campus speech forum was, by definition, viewpoint discriminatory
because it suppressed speech from a particular, that is to say religious,
208
perspective.
The Court there never asked the plaintiff student
religious groups to show that the University of Virginia was targeting
them for unequal treatment because of disagreement with their
209
message or animus toward them.
Indeed, there was no evidence
that the university was anti-religious, and the university had proffered
neutral justifications for the policy, such as avoiding Establishment
210
Clause problems and prioritizing among scarce fiscal resources. Yet
the Court understood that the objective purpose and function of the
policy was to discriminate against an entire perspective and
211
viewpoint.
Assuming that the Hill Court understood the two formulations
(disagreement/justified without reference) to mean the same thing,
the conflated definition requires at least a showing that the language
of the statute clearly selects a type of content or viewpoint for
212
disfavored treatment, or selects another for preferential treatment;
that the standard for content discrimination does not require a showing of an
invidious motive to discriminate against certain types of speech).
206. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 683 (holding that the station’s decision to exclude
Forbes from a candidate debate was “a reasonable, viewpoint neutral exercise of
journalistic discretion” and within the bounds of acceptable regulation under the
First Amendment).
207. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
208. See id. at 831-32 (finding viewpoint discrimination was demonstrated in the
university’s policy of not banning religion as a subject matter in general, but refusing
to pay for a student paper written from a religious perspective).
209. See id. at 840-42 (focusing instead on the university’s overall treatment of all
religious groups that are interested in student media funding).
210. See id. at 835-37.
211. See id. at 835, 845-46 (determining that viewpoint discrimination cannot be
justified by economic scarcity, that scanning student articles for underlying religious
beliefs is a denial of free speech, and it is not a violation of the Establishment Clause
to uphold the Free Speech Clause).
212. It should be noted that the Court has not held that facial content
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or that the state’s expressed justification for the statute directly
implicates the content of speech. Hence, a law banning the
presentation of films that present certain sexual acts as acceptable or
proper behavior, with the stated objective of protecting public morals
213
from such material, would indicate government “disagreement”
with a particular viewpoint. A law expressly prohibiting labor
picketing but not picketing on other subjects would be deemed
content-based. But what if, as in Hill, the statutory text and the
expressed justifications for it are not so explicit? What if attentive
constitutional lawyers are drafting the laws? Does the government in
that case have free reign?
The Court’s definition was not unprecedented. In fact, the Court
discrimination in the text of a statute or regulation always violates the First
Amendment. In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court held
that a zoning regulation expressly limiting the location of theaters showing sexually
explicit adult films was not content-based because the stated purpose of the
ordinance was to prevent crime and protect property values, not restrict speech
content. Id. at 47-48. In other words, it was justified without reference to the
content of speech. Although the Renton opinion suggested that its reasoning might
only apply to sexually explicit speech of “lesser” import than political speech, see id. at
49 n.2 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)), the
plurality opinion in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), hinted that the government’s
justification rather than a facial content restriction might be the decisive factor in
determining content neutrality for some regulations of political speech. See id. at
320-21. In Ward, the Court stated that the “government’s purpose [for the
regulation] is the controlling consideration.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989). Some scholars have interpreted the Court’s standard as permitting
a facially content-based speech restriction if it is accompanied by a facially neutral
justification. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 762 (1997) (arguing that a facial content restriction in a statute creates a
rebuttable presumption that the statute is content-based); Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 633-35 (1991) (arguing
that Renton and Boos suggest that a regulation is content discriminatory only if the
government’s purpose is related to speech content). Nevertheless, the Court in
these cases did not definitively rule that a content-neutral justification will overcome
facial content restrictions in a regulation of speech other than sexually explicit
speech. The regulation in Ward did not contain a facial content restriction, so that
case focused appropriately on the government’s justification for the regulation. In a
later case, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), the Court
held that a regulation restricting only newsracks for commercial handbills was
content-based notwithstanding the government’s expressed neutral purpose of
protecting safety and esthetics. See id. at 428-30. Also, the Court in Hill itself cited as
compelling evidence of content neutrality the Colorado courts’ interpretation that
the “statutory language makes no reference to the content of the speech.” See Hill v.
Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2780, 2491 (2000) (footnote and internal quotation marks
omitted). Later in the opinion, the majority stated that the law was content-neutral
because, in its view, the statute “places no restrictions on . . . either a particular
viewpoint or any subject matter.” Id. at 2493. Consequently, we believe that under
the standard applied in Hill, either a facially content-based restriction in the statute
or a content-related government justification would trigger a finding of content
discrimination. Of course, our central point is that reliance only on facial neutrality
in the statute and its justification makes it much easier for governments to
discriminate on the basis of content and viewpoint.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
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214
borrowed the language from Ward and other cases. But the highly
problematic nature of its exclusive reliance on, and narrow
interpretation of, the discrimination definition shows up far more
glaringly in Hill. The regulation in Ward, for example, a case
involving volume restrictions for outdoor concerts, was
unambiguously directed at noise, not at any particular performer or
genre, and indeed noise at the periphery of the event, not at its very
215
heart. There was, however, abundant evidence in Hill that, despite
the facially neutral language of Section 3 and its purported
216
justification, the complete text, operation, and discriminatory
function of the statute revealed an intent to restrict one particular
217
kind of speech, namely anti-abortion speech.

D. Unwillingness to Scratch the Surface
One of the major frustrations of the dissenters in Hill was that the
majority ignored or dismissed a variety of obvious signs that there was
more to this statute than simply a desire to protect all health care
214. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 295 (1984)) (determining that even in a public forum
the government may impose restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and then leave open areas for communication of information); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (describing content-neutral speech as those
restrictions that “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech”) (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.).
215. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 792. The respondents in Ward, concert promoters,
claimed that the ordinance regulated “sound quality” not noise, and thus it was a
restriction on artistic content. The Court responded rightly that the ordinance
regulated only excessive volume, not sound mixes or other elements of sound quality
that might reasonably be deemed to relate to artistic content. See id. at 792-93. Also,
there was no persuasive evidence presented that the city’s rules inhibited delivery of
the respondent’s message in any way, or that the respondents relied on the outdoor
facilities more extensively than many other groups subject to the regulation.
216. Actually, the plain language of Section 3 was not completely neutral. See
discussion supra Part II.C.
217. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994), and Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997), the Court upheld parts of
injunctions which restricted the speech activities of only certain anti-abortion
protesters, finding that the injunctions were not content or viewpoint-based. These
holdings on content and viewpoint neutrality are inapposite to Hill, however,
because Madsen and Schenck applied strictly to injunctions against parties previously
adjudged to have engaged in wrongful conduct. The statute in Hill applies to
persons irrespective of previous wrongful conduct. As the court in Madsen stated:
An injunction . . . applies only to a particular group . . . and regulates the
activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group. It does so, however,
because of the group’s past actions . . . [T]he court hearing the action is
charged with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation, not with the
drafting of a statute addressed to the general public.
Id. at 762.
The court also correctly observed that to “accept petitioners’ claim would be to
classify virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint-based. Id.
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patients across the state of Colorado.
Indeed, there were many
such signs, but the majority nevertheless held to its view that if the
statute made no explicit textual distinctions between types of content
or viewpoints, and if the stated justification for the law was not
expressly related to the content and viewpoint of speech, the law was
219
then content and viewpoint neutral. Close scrutiny of some of the
evidence of content and viewpoint discrimination calls into question
the majority’s analysis on this point.
As Justice Kennedy observed, the plain language of the overall
statute itself provides compelling evidence that the legislature was
220
focused on anti-abortion protests.
Section 1 of the statute, which
expresses the legislature’s purpose, states that “the exercise of a
person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical
procedures must be balanced against another person’s right to obtain
221
medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner.”
This is the only reference in the statute to any specific kind of protest,
and it can only be rationally interpreted as a reference to antiabortion protests. Pro-choice advocates do not protest against
medical procedures. Striking nurses do not protest against medical
procedures. It is hard to think of anyone else who does. And while
animal rights activists may protest against experimentation on
222
animals at medical research facilities, they generally do not protest
at clinics or hospitals against medical procedures for human beings.
The statute’s operation strongly suggests a purpose to curb antiabortion speech. As discussed above, Section 2 already directly
addresses the non-speech conduct that the law was ostensibly
218. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2510 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that if the real purpose of the statute was to protect all health care patients,
then all the statute would need is a narrowly tailored provision such as that in
subsection (2) of the statute, which subjects those who knowingly prevent entry or
exit from a health care facility to criminal and civil liability).
219. See id. at 2491 (stating that the statute’s restrictions apply to all
demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and that government regulation of expressive
activity is content and viewpoint neutral if justified without making distinctions
between content of regulated speech).
220. See id. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing the preamble to the statute,
which restricts “a person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical
procedures, “demonstrates the legislature’s intent to only restrict speech of abortion
protestors, and concluding that the “certain medical procedures” language obviously
refers to abortions, as evidenced by testimony recorded before the Colorado
legislature).
221. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
222. See Brief of Amicus Curiae People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals at *1*2, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000), 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1856 (No. 981856) (Nov. 12, 1999) (expressing concern that the statute could affect its protests
against animal research conducted in a “health care facility”). Revealingly, PETA
also felt the need to emphasize that the organization “takes no view whatever on the
issue of abortion.” See id. at *2.
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intended to address: obstructing, detaining, hindering, impeding, or
223
blocking entry or exits to facilities.
Moreover, other generally
applicable Colorado statutes address harassment, intimidation, and
224
obstruction.
Section 3 addresses pure speech activities such as
leafleting, displaying a sign, or oral protest, education, or
225
counseling, and only pure speech activities around “health care
226
facilities.”
The phrase “health care facilities” obviously includes abortion
clinics, which are well-known as the primary site of protest for anti227
abortion demonstrators.
The legislature was acutely aware of this
fact as well. The state’s brief is full of excerpts from testimony to the
228
legislature describing very aggressive anti-abortion protests.
Although the state, in describing these events, refers carefully to
protests occurring at “health care facilities,” abundant factual details
such as the content of signs or the words uttered by the protesters,
indicate unmistakably that all of the events described were anti229
abortion protests at abortion clinics.
Despite the insistence by the state and its amici that the law was
equally intended to protect patients at facilities that do not perform
230
abortions, the record in support of that argument is paper-thin.
223. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(2) (2000) (declaring it to be a Class 3
misdemeanor if a person uses the means to prevent a person from entering or
exiting a health care facility).
224. See, e.g., id. § 18-9-111 (2000) (establishing a criminal violation for following a
person in or about a public place “with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm”); id. § 18-9107(a) (making it an offense to knowingly or recklessly obstruct a street, sidewalk, or
building entrance).
225. See id. § 18-9-122(3).
226. Id. (stating that a person may not engage in listed activities within one
hundred feet of any entrance to a health care facility).
227. Id. § 18-9-122(3) (defining “health care facility” as “any entity that is licensed,
certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to administer medical
treatment”).
228. See Brief for Respondents at *1-3, *19, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480
(2000) (No. 98-1856) (providing examples of legislative debate and testimony).
229. See id. at *19 (describing patients being called “murderer” and “baby-killing
bitch” by protestors); id. at *2 (referring to the activities of Operation Rescue).
230. See, e.g., id. at *18 n.13 (arguing that the statute is aimed at all conduct and
demonstrators, and that this is supported by the amicus briefs from the People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals and the AFL-CIO for the petitioners); Brief of
Amici Curiae State of New York at *4-*6, Hill v. Colorado, 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs
1856 (No. 98-1856) (Dec. 3, 1999) (providing only examples of violent conduct
outside health care facilities that provide abortions); Brief of Amici Curiae American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Medical Association at
*2-*5, Hill v. Colorado, 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1856 (No. 98-1856) (Dec. 3, 1999)
(focusing entirely on the effects of protests outside health care facilities that provide
abortions); Brief United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *14-*15,
Hill v. Colorado, 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1856 (No. 98-1856) (Dec. 16, 1999)
(detailing dramatic encounters with protests outside abortion clinics, but only two
non-abortion protests); see also supra notes 217, 221 and accompanying text
(delineating the dearth of evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that the
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The only witness for this proposition cited in any of the briefs was a
representative of a disabled citizens group who apparently did not
testify about any protests in Colorado that affected the disabled, but
who said he had heard of problems with an animal rights protest in
231
Pittsburgh and an anti-Medicaid protest in Florida. Moreover, the
statute does not even apply to the offices of dentists, optometrists,
232
and chiropractors, despite the fact that protests outside these
facilities could theoretically discourage patients from entering or
elevate their stress levels. But, of course, abortions are never
performed at these facilities. The conclusion that the statute was
designed to and would function to stifle anti-abortion protest is
inescapable based on the following: the thinly-veiled reference to
anti-abortion protests in Section 1 of the statute; the existence of
other laws (including Section 2) addressing the conduct ostensibly
targeted by the state; the overwhelming focus of the legislative history
on anti-abortion demonstrations; the application of the statute to a
limited universe of facilities that includes the central locus of antiabortion protests; all combined with the unlikelihood that permission
to approach will be refused to the friends of clinic patients and staff.
But if that were not enough, the record also provides explicit
evidence that many members of the legislature itself objected to the
content of the protestors’ speech.
The legislature “heard
descriptions of demonstrations that were highly offensive in both
233
their content and in their location . . . .” During debate, members
of the legislature discussed the “extremely offensive terms” used by
234
Legislators listened to testimony
anti-abortion demonstrators.
about protestors “flashing their bloody fetus signs,” and yelling “you
235
Some members of the Colorado Senate
are killing your baby.”
committee considering the bill “expressed disgust at photographs
236
distributed by one opponent of the bill.”
The Court’s majority briefly recognized that “the enactment was
statute is intended to protect patients at facilities other than abortion clinics).
231. See Amici Brief for City of Boulder and the City and County of Denver at *18,
Hill v. Colorado, 1998 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1856 (No. 98-1856) (Dec. 13, 1999)
(testifying about a protest in Pittsburgh by animal rights activists over the transplant
of a baboon liver into a patient dying of hepatitis, and an anti-Medicaid protest in
Florida in which a disabled person was knocked out of his wheelchair).
232. See Brief for Respondents at *11 n.9, Hill v. Colorado (No. 98-1856) (citing
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-106 (1999)).
233. Id. at *24.
234. Id. at *19.
235. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Colo. 1999) (reviewing the
legislative hearing record).
236. Jennifer Gavin, Abortion Clinics Zone OK; Senate Panel Passes Bill Despite Protests,
DENV. POST, Mar. 4, 1993, at 4B.
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primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”
But, despite all of this vivid evidence, the Court found no basis for
concern that the enactment might be content or viewpoint-based
because Section 3 of the statute did not on its face distinguish
abortion speech from other kinds of speech and the state offered
some expressly speech-neutral justifications for Section 3. The
legislative history and the fact that there is no other plausible way of
understanding the statute should have alerted the majority to the
overwhelming prospect that this is a statute whose entire purpose and
function are targeted at a particular category of political speech and
protest. This case is, in fact, the speech equivalent of Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.238 The Lukumi Babalu case
was a free exercise-of-religion issue in which, despite a superficially
neutral text and justification, the statute’s context left only one
plausible conclusion: that the whole purpose of the enactment was to
stifle the religious free exercise of one group. Unlike Lukumi Babalu,
however, the suddenly credulous Hill Court refused to look beyond
239
facial neutrality.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO
DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS
Justice Scalia responded to the Court’s argument that “justified by
240
reference to content” meant that the text of the statute had to
explicitly make content or viewpoint-based distinctions or that the
purported rationale for the statute had to be expressly content-based
by noting that this particular phrase originated from the Court’s
241
decision in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley.
The
Mosley Court’s statement entailed two parts: “Selective exclusions
from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not
242
be justified by reference to content alone.”
Justice Scalia’s
perceptive point here was that while the principal inquiry for content
and viewpoint discrimination may be to look for express legislative

237. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2000).
238. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
239. Id. (determining that the facial neutrality of an ordinance governing the
killing of animals was in reality a gerrymander of the ordinance to prohibit the
religious killings of animals by practioners of the Santeria religion).
240. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “justified by reference to content” is a prohibition in addition to, not to
be used in the place of, the prohibition against facially content-based restrictions); see
also Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
242. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
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243

disagreement with the message of the speech at issue, this is not the
244
only method of inquiry available to the Court. Mosley itself actually
created two possible tests, applying the “not based on content
245
alone” test to explicit content-based distinctions, and using the
246
“justified by reference to content” test to permit the Court to look
247
past the face of the statute and the objectives proffered by the state.
To take the next step of constitutional analysis was good advice, and
the majority should have followed this advice, but unfortunately there
is no existing doctrinal formula for analysis where the next step
should lead us.
Hill is thus a case that begs for the development of an objective
content and viewpoint discrimination analysis under the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. This analysis should look not only
at the facial character of a statute and its stated purpose, but the
substantive character in social, historical, and political context as well.
Under this analysis, a court would first look to the text of the
statutory or regulatory enactment and its expressed rationale for any
indications of explicit content or viewpoint discrimination. If none is
apparent or the expressed rationale appears pretextual or mere
camouflage, the Court would then assess, among other things, the
248
actual operation and social function of the statute and “the specific
series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in
243. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2491 (majority opinion) (examining legislative
disagreement with the speech to determine whether there is content and viewpoint
discrimination).
244. See id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that it is “not the only inquiry”).
245. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
246. Id.; see also Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2491 (2000).
247. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the “justified by reference to
content” language from Mosley was “a prohibition in addition to, rather than in place
of, the prohibition of facially content-based restrictions” embodied by the “not based
on content” language). Justice Scalia also provided two illuminating examples of
how the “justified without reference to content” standard should be more properly
understood. First, an ordinance aimed at reducing noise but applicable only to
sound trucks delivering messages of “protest” cannot reasonably be said to be
“justified without reference” to the content of speech, despite the fact that noise
reduction, standing alone, is a governmental justification unrelated to content. See
id. “Even a law that has as its [stated] purpose something unrelated to the
suppression of particular content cannot irrationally single out that content for its
prohibition.” Id. Second, Justice Scalia pointed out that the approach of even a
peaceful “sidewalk counselor” may result in the “secondary effect” of deeply
upsetting a woman planning an abortion. See id. “But that is not an effect which
occurs ‘without reference to the content’ of the speech.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
248. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-35
(1993) (stating that the Court in Free Exercise cases should look beyond facial
neutrality and proceed to examine the operation of the ordinance at issue); cf. Karst,
supra note 7, at 37. Karst coined the phrase “de facto content discrimination” to
refer to situations where a facially content neutral statute resulted in differential
impacts on various groups along content lines.
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question, and the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by members of the
249
decisionmaking body.” Bringing all of these factors together in the
final analysis, the court employing the objective content and
viewpoint discrimination analysis would ask this decisive question:
Given all that we know about the historical, legal, and social
context of this enactment or policy, what is the most plausible
understanding of its purpose and function as they relate to the
content and viewpoint of speech to be affected?

First Amendment analysis, under this theory, would invalidate
statutes and regulations “whose social meaning renders them
abridgements of speech,” in Professor Tribe’s excellent phrase, and
would consider “any evident pattern of official action that a
reasonably well-informed observer would interpret as suppressing a
250
particular point of view.”
The purpose of formalizing an objective content and viewpoint
analysis is to prevent government from dressing up speechdiscriminatory regulations in the clothing of official neutrality, as the
Colorado legislature so clearly did with Section 3 and as the Arkansas
Educational Television Commission did in the Forbes case. The test
should be used only to determine whether a statute is content or
viewpoint-based, not to determine the whole validity of the statute. If,
after applying the test, a court finds objective speech discrimination,
then the enactment would still be subject to further review under
251
strict scrutiny. In Hill, if the Court had pierced the veil of textual
and purposive “neutrality” and found that the only plausible purpose
and function of the Colorado statute were to impose content and
viewpoint discrimination, it would have proceeded to determine
252
whether the statute was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
If there were truly a medical necessity for banning approaches to
people near abortion clinics, then by all means, let us consider the
evidence for it within the appropriate analytical framework. It is
plausible to imagine that legitimate medical necessity could outweigh
249. Id. at 540.
250. See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 820.
251. See Williams, supra note 212, at 700 (arguing that a free speech analytical
methodology based on an objective assessment of either legislative motive or
government purpose should not result in automatic invalidation of a statute or
regulation but instead should lead to further analysis under strict scrutiny).
252. Thus, a court in this situation might find that protecting women in the
exercise of their right to abortion from anti-abortion speech is a compelling interest
and that banning approaches outside clinics is the least restrictive alternative. We do
not know whether this is the case, and we have our doubts, but surely this would be a
more intellectually honest and speech-friendly approach to the problem.
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the constitutional injuries caused by this kind of content and
viewpoint discrimination. The case, however, must be made under
strict scrutiny to ensure that fundamental constitutional rights receive
appropriate weight in the analysis and that the least burdensome
means of addressing the problem are selected.
Requiring a court to look beyond the facial characteristics of a
statute and its formal justifications to its substance, effect, and
253
meaning is hardly a radical proposition in the constitutional realm.
Courts utilize this technique to screen improper motives and
254
purposes, be they invidious or paternalistic, in a variety of contexts,
255
256
including the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise Clause,
257
and the Establishment Clause.
A reluctance to permit the same
kind of analysis under the Free Speech Clause stems from United
States v. O’Brien,258 a thoroughly dubious decision in which the Court
said that it would “not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute
259
The Court stated
on the basis of alleged illicit legislative motive.”
that “inquiries into [Congressional] motives or purposes are a
hazardous matter . . . . What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of
others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
260
guesswork.”
But this fear of compiling a variety of individual motivations is
misplaced since objective First Amendment analysis invites us to focus
253. See Williams, supra note 212, at 698-99 & n.312 (supporting an objective
government purpose analysis to determine content discrimination and identifying
some other scholars who support this kind of approach); TRIBE, supra note 24, at 820
(pointing out that the ruling in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), “failed to
acknowledge, let alone account for, the many cases in which [legislative motive] has
been the focus of constitutional adjudication”).
254. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 228-29 (1983) (noting that paternalistic motivations for speech
restrictions, such as protecting citizens from the effects of offensive speech, are
“constitutionally disfavored”).
255. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Necessarily, an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts . . . .”).
256. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(“The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial
discrimination.”).
257. See id.; see also Jamin B. Raskin, Polling Establishment: Judicial Review, Democracy
and the Endorsement Theory of the Establishment Clause, 60 MD. L. REV. 761 (2001).
258. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
259. Id. at 383; see also Williams, supra note 212, at 697-98 (noting the O’Brien
Court’s concerns about assessing actual legislative motives in enacting a statute);
TRIBE, supra note 24, at 820 (noting that even though the O’Brien Court expressed
reservations about making determination of legislative intent, it nevertheless
concluded “that O’Brien had not proven the impermissible [legislative] motive that
he alleged”).
260. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84.
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on the broader purpose and function of having a particular statutory
enactment rather than the motivations of individual legislators in
261
262
supporting it.
The analysis that we and others have proposed is
not an attempt at subjective mind-reading or legislative
psychoanalysis.
Rather, it is an objective “totality of the
263
circumstances” test that examines in an anthropological way the
purpose, meaning and function of a speech regulation. In any event,
the concerns outlined by the O’Brien Court, if valid, could be
employed to undermine the purpose-based objective tests the Court
264
has already embraced in the religion and equal protection contexts.
If an objective, purpose-based test had been applied by the Hill
Court, rather than its absurdly myopic and tendentious reading of
the statute, the outcome of the content and viewpoint neutrality
analysis—and ultimately the case itself—would have been radically
different. The Court would have been drawn to Justice Kennedy’s
conclusion that “[t]he purpose and design of the statute—as
everyone ought to know and as its own defenders urge in attempted
justification—are to restrict speakers on one side of the debate: those
265
who protest abortions.”
V. RESCUING THE FIRST AMENDMENT FROM ABORTION POLITICS
The driving subtext of both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Hill is the politics of abortion and the organizing image on both sides
is the aggressive tactics of the anti-abortion forces outside abortion
clinics. The majority emphasizes the state’s interest in assuring
“unimpeded access to health care facilities and the avoidance of
potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational
261. A recent example can be seen in the majority opinion in Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). The Court said that “when a governmental entity
professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy, the government’s
characterization is, of course, entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the
duty of the courts to distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.” Id. at
2278 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
262. See Williams, supra note 212, at 698 n.312 (citing A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 209 (1962); Ira Michael Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial
Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49 CAL. L. REV. 104, 115-16 (1961); MacCullum,
Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 756-57 (1966); Developments in the Law—Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1091 (1969)).
263. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(explaining that to detect content and viewpoint discrimination “[t]he Court must
survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
264. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (inquiring into the purpose
of the statute for the purpose of equal protection analysis); TRIBE, supra note 24, at
1204 (explaining that the establishment clause requires “secular purpose, secular
effect, and no excessive entanglement”).
265. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2517 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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protests.”
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, suggests that
anti-abortion counselors will still be able to get their message out
since “the statute places no limitation on the number of speakers or
267
the noise level, including the use of amplification equipment . . . .”
Implicit in such arguments is a kind of swift denigration of the
paradigmatic speech encounter the statute’s authors seem to have
targeted for regulation: the direct, uninvited approach of an antiabortion protestor to a woman entering an abortion clinic to
persuade her to “reconsider” her decision or “think about giving your
268
baby up for adoption” or not “murder your child.”
The majority
obviously considers such an exchange of so little value that normal
First Amendment analysis need not apply.
For their part, the dissenters repeatedly charge the liberals in the
majority with hypocrisy in pursuit of an abortion-rights Constitution.
Justice Scalia writes: “[t]here is apparently no end to the distortion
of our First Amendment law that the Court is willing to endure in
order to sustain this restriction upon the free speech of abortion
269
opponents.”
He further charges: “[t]he Court today elevates the
270
Justice Kennedy
abortion clinic to the status of the home.”
speculates that “our predecessors would not have hesitated” to
invalidate a statute regulating “oral protest, education or counseling”
271
within 100 feet of “the entrance to any lunch counter,” an effective
rhetorical thrust (but an ambiguous one since it is unclear to which
“predecessors” he is referring). He continues: “It should be a
profound disappointment to defenders of the First Amendment that
the Court today refuses to apply the same structural analysis when the
272
speech involved is less palatable to it.”
And so it is a disappointment. But it must also be said that the
conservative dissenting Justices have displayed egregious viewpointblindness of their own. After all, it was Justice Kennedy himself who
authored the majority decision in Forbes upholding Arkansas’
exclusion of an Independent congressional candidate from a state266. Id. at 2489 (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753
(1994) and NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979)).
267. Id. at 2495.
268. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that opponents of abortion have the
“right to persuade women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is
wrong”); see also Operation Rescue v. Planned Parenthood, 975 S.W.2d 546, 550
(Tex. 1998) (describing the activities of the abortion protestors as ranging from
“peaceful efforts to convey information” to more aggressive, “confrontational”
tactics).
269. Id. at 2509 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2517 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
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managed television channel’s candidate debate between his
273
Democratic and Republican rivals.
The Court’s blithe acceptance
of “viability” as the basis for rejecting a politically conservative
Independent candidate’s participation in such a governmentsponsored debate may have reflected the Republican Party’s concern
about the political impact of Ross Perot and other Independent
274
candidates on the electoral prospects of Republicans. More to the
point, while Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Scalia are free-speech
zealots when it comes to unsolicited counseling speech outside
abortion clinics, they all voted to uphold federal regulations
forbidding doctors inside Title X-funded medical clinics to counsel
275
their pregnant patients about abortion in Rust v. Sullivan.
Surely
that decision was a massive defeat for free speech, dressed up though
it was as a decision about permissible conditions on government
funding.
For citizens who defend both the hard-won right of women to
choose an abortion, now protected in the Casey v. Planned
Parenthood276 decision, and the right of women and men to engage in
political free expression, there is a dilemma. Should the Hill decision
be quietly indulged as a necessary minor sacrifice of free speech
principles for the greater cause of the right to reproductive privacy?
Or is there an approach to Hill that rejects the majority’s
embarrassing First Amendment contortions yet remains steadfast in
support of the right of reproductive autonomy and choice?
We contend that there is such a position. In 1994, Congress passed
277
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), which
provides for both criminal and civil penalties against persons who use
force, the threat of force, physical obstruction or property damage to
interfere with persons obtaining or providing reproductive health
278
services, including abortion. FACE is an excellent statute that has
resulted in the prosecution of numerous persons for violent crimes at
273. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
274. The Forbes majority consisted of all of the Republican-appointed Justices
except Justice Souter, and one Justice (Breyer) appointed by a Democrat. See id. at
668.
275. 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (“The Secretary’s regulations are a permissible
construction of Title X and do not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution.”).
276. 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
277. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 248).
278. See id. (indicating that the statute’s goals are to “protect and promote the
public safety and health and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing
Federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening,
obstructive and destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere
with persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services”).
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clinics, including murder, arson, destruction of property, and so
279
on.
Progressive champions of the First Amendment have no
problem supporting vigorous prosecution of people who violate this
statute. Here, the crime is actual physical obstruction of, and
violence against, women exercising their constitutional rights as well
as physicians and other medical personnel engaged in the lawful
provision of medical services. There is no constitutional or moral
reason why people should not go to jail for the bombing or vandalism
of clinics or for participating in physical blockades of clinics when
women are trying to enter.
But the anti-abortion speech regulated by Section 3 of the
Colorado statute, unpleasant or undesirable though it may be, does
not reflect the conduct-based approach of the federal statute. It is
Section 2 of Colorado’s law that mirrors the federal approach.
Section 3 simply targets unwanted expression, disfavored speech
about favored rights. When the point at which anti-abortion
expression (or any other kind) reaches a degree of relentless
personal harassment that is unacceptable within a civilized society, we
should call it stalking. At that point, the First Amendment would lose
any power over it. But, short of that kind of conduct, we must
tolerate speech that is offensive to us in order to have a democracy
where the government cannot gerrymander the processes of political
discourse and thinking.
Yet, perhaps we are wrong, it may be suggested, and the majority is
right to diminish and dismiss the value of such anti-choice sidewalk
expression. After all, what use is it concretely under our First
Amendment? Perhaps this is the case that teaches us that political
speech does not necessarily have intrinsic value.
Yet here is where we must grab the bull by the horns. The First
Amendment tolerates absolutist beliefs among citizens, but it does
not and cannot legislate them. Thus, both the anti-abortion
protesters and the abortion clinic escorts who have organized against
them can engage in passionate street debate, with one side yelling
that abortion is murder and the other that women should have an
unrestricted right to abortion. The state nevertheless cannot declare
279. See, e.g., United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1379 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming conviction for violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(“FACE”)); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 928-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming
a criminal conviction under FACE); Milwaukee Women’s Med. Servs., Inc. v. Brock, 2
F. Supp.2d 1172, 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (granting civil damages against defendants
who had been criminally convicted for violating FACE); Greenhut v. Hand, 996 F.
Supp. 372, 374, 379 (D.N.J. 1998) (imposing civil liability for statutory damages on a
defendant who had pled guilty to criminal violation of FACE).
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one side right and the other side wrong in a public forum by banning
expressions of dissent from the official orthodoxy. Regardless of
what the law is on abortion, from a First Amendment perspective all
sides are deemed to have viewpoints of equal plausibility and validity.
One side cannot be favored over all others by making it impossible
for dissenting views to be expressed.
This principle is rooted in the very idea of the democratic
sovereignty of the people. The state cannot interfere in free social
communication to suppress or magnify particular ideological
viewpoints in the public. Sometimes this idea is expressed as the
280
need of the people to have a “marketplace of ideas” to sort out
truth and falsehood. Sometimes it is expressed more directly as a
281
requirement of democracy. Sometimes it is expressed as preserving
282
a space for individual self-expression.
Regardless of the precise
theory of the First Amendment chosen, it is fundamental that the
state itself cannot dictate the terms of political dialogue in public
places.
This is not a difficult principle. What is difficult about Hill is
simply that different citizens are using the street and sidewalk for
different purposes. The anti-abortion protestors are using the
sidewalks for political exhortation and persuasion while women
entering clinics are using the sidewalks for safe passage, to walk on as
they meet a physician for a lawful medical procedure. Undoubtedly,
the vast majority of such patients would prefer not to be bothered by
283
the anti-abortion “counselors,” although Justice Kennedy does cite
the case of one woman who testified before the Colorado Senate that
a sidewalk counselor actually dissuaded her from having an

280. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas [and]
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market”).
281. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993); Alexander Meiklejohn, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26-27 (1948) (“The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities
of the program of self-government . . . . It is a dedication from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”); Steven G.
Gray, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 230 (1996)
(describing free speech as “the essential democratic precept that everyone in society
has the right to disagree—verbally, loudly and even obnoxiously—with even the most
fundamental values represented by the political majority and its government”).
282. See generally EDWIN C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989)
(claiming that “the liberty theory”—unlike the “marketplace of ideas theory”—
“provides the most coherent understanding of the first amendment”).
283. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (using
the terms “protestor, counselor, educator” to refer to abortion opponents who want
to convey their view to people entering abortion clinics).
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284

abortion. If this testimony is accurate, it demonstrates not that the
speech was “correct” but simply that it can affect the unfolding course
285
of human events, which is all constitutional democracy requires. In
general, though, most would agree that the speech, however wellintended, is unwelcome. The question then becomes whether the
state can declare the use of the public forum off-limits in particular
ways to provide for a stress-free passage through it.
So we return to the central idea of the public forum. Streets,
sidewalks and parks all have uses such as transportation, pedestrian
traffic, recreation—that can be considered primary, depending on
286
the time and place.
The public forum idea would be ruined,
however, if free speech gave way each time persons engaged in noncommunicative purposes were somehow made to feel uncomfortable
or distressed by the presence of citizens speaking to them on a
political topic. The ultimate precariousness of the public forum
requires the government to show a compelling interest to overcome
speech rights. The desire of some listeners to avoid certain speech
does not constitute a compelling interest.
It is no doubt unpleasant for most women en route to an abortion
clinic to endure the unsought advice, education, heckling, or
condemnation of self-appointed sidewalk counselors. The First
Amendment nevertheless protects the right to disagree with other
people’s lawful actions and also to give offense—which is why citizens
287
can wear jackets in a courthouse that say “Fuck the Draft” or burn
American flags in a public plaza to show opposition to the
288
government. If the state could show that the kind of offense given
284. See id. at 2529 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to Justice Kennedy’s
excerpt of the testimony, the woman said in part:
The people supplying the pamphlet helped me make my choice. I got an
informed decision, I got information from both sides, and I made an
informed decision that my son and I could both live with. Because of this
picture I was given, right there, this little boy got a chance at life that he
never would have had.
Id.
285. Similarly, the exclusion of a third-party candidate from a state-run candidate
debate can and often will change the outcome of the election. See Raskin, supra note
14, at 1998-99 (arguing that changes in the “dynamics” of political campaigns that
follow public debates should result from “dialogue among the candidates” and not
the unconstitutional practice of viewpoint discrimination by government sponsors
who exclude certain candidates).
286. See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 987 (“The ‘public forum’ doctrine holds that
restrictions on speech should be subject to higher scrutiny when, all other things
being equal, that speech occurs in areas playing a vital role in communication—such
as . . . streets, sidewalks, and parks—especially because of how indispensable
communication in these places is to people who lack access to more elaborate (and
more costly) channels.”).
287. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
288. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (finding that “the state’s
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by anti-choice activists to women walking into an abortion clinic rises
to the level of a health threat, then the state could have a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify a Colorado-style regulation, assuming
the regulation is the least burdensome means of addressing the
threat. The state and its amici did provide some evidence of health
risks, such as elevated stress levels before treatment. Such showings
are precisely the evidence that should have been at the heart of a
strict scrutiny analysis. Short of credible evidence of authentic health
risks, pro-choice Americans should continue to support the abortion
289
clinic escort groups that stand with women as they walk into clinics,
counter anti-abortion speech in public places with pro-choice speech,
and push for aggressive investigation and prosecution of antiabortion terrorists, while standing by the First Amendment rights of
all citizens in public places.
CONCLUSION
Hill provides governments with an astoundingly simple blueprint
for restricting and chilling political speech whenever the targeted
speakers need access to a specific part of the public forum. All the
state need do is identify the preferred speech locations of the
offending speakers; then identify a slightly larger class of similar areas
or establishments of which such locales are a subset; design a
regulation that restricts the speech of any person present in the
public forum near the covered class of areas; and provide a facially
neutral state interest or objective as a justification for speech
regulations in this class of areas, a task made easier by the
development of a constitutionally acceptable “interest” that citizens
have in being left alone by political speakers.
Thus, if a state is vexed by protests outside lunch counters that
refuse to serve racial minorities, it can enact a regulation limiting
unconsented approaches for speech purposes by any person (not just
opponents of segregation) within 100 feet of the entrance of food
service establishments. As a justification, the state would cite the
legitimate content-neutral interests of protecting ingress and egress
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity [does
not] justify [a] criminal conviction for engaging in political expression”).
289. See Sarah Milstein, Clinic Escorts Stand for Choice, at www.plannedparenthood.
com/articles/escort.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2001) (“Being a clinic escort is
empowering because the need for it is very real, and being confronted by anti-choice
protestors is very challenging.”); Letter from an Abortion Clinic Patient Escort, at
http://www.refuseandresist.org/ab/112700escort.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2001)
(“The impact of volunteer escorting on the entering patients is immediately
apparent . . . It also gives a needed calming physical presence in support of choice, in
answer to the oppressive physical presence of the protesters.”).

RASKINPP

2001]

1/24/02 5:59 PM

DISFAVORED SPEECH ABOUT FAVORED RIGHTS

227

to eating establishments, maintaining the interest diners have in
being left alone, preserving the free flow of commerce, and ensuring
that citizens can eat the foods they deem most nutritious and
satisfying without disruption. Lest anyone think this concern
hyperbolic, the majority in Hill itself said that a statute making it a
crime “to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without ordering food
would . . . not be ‘content-based’ even if it were enacted by a racist
290
legislature that hated civil rights protesters . . . .” While the majority
did say that such a statute might raise concerns about the state’s
legitimate interest at issue, it is hard to see how the majority would
ever even arrive at a serious examination of that issue given the ready
availability of neutral-sounding justifications. Given that the men,
women and children of the modern civil rights movement endured
vicious verbal abuse by racist whites in the South in public places
without even proposing to dismantle their First Amendment rights, it
does seem a bit ironic that many of today’s progressives are so quick
to cut into essential free speech liberties.
Similarly, if a state is opposed to gay rights activists leafleting on
Sundays near the churches of conservative religious congregations
that oppose homosexuality, it can enact a criminal law banning
unconsented approaches by any person within 100 feet of the
entrance of all houses of worship. The justification for the statute
would be to protect citizens from harassment and intimidation,
following and dogging, as they attempt to freely exercise their First
Amendment rights to practice their faiths. A legislature in a right-towork state perturbed by union picketing outside paper mills can pass
a law that prohibits unconsented approaches by any person within
100 feet of the entrance of all industrial facilities for the stated
purpose of ensuring the free flow of commerce, securing the right to
contract, and protecting employees from stresses that diminish
worker safety and productivity. In each of these cases, the statutes
would be facially content and viewpoint neutral under the reasoning
of Hill since they apply to any person regardless of the content or
viewpoint of their speech, and are “justified without reference to the
291
content of regulated speech.”
This string of not-so-hypothetical hypotheticals shows the massive
potential damage lurking within the Hill decision. If left unchecked,
Hill will enable new schemes of “neutral” censorship, with disparate
and substantial impact on those who have the least access to
alternative media of communication. The result will be a discretely
290. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 (2000).
291. Id. at 2491.
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sanitized marketplace of ideas, one partially cleansed of challenges to
reigning official orthodoxies. Some of the expressive dissonance that
has propelled, and continues to propel, society on its search for a
more perfect liberty will be filtered away.
The Hill template will achieve this result directly by hamstringing
those who wish to speak in public and restricting the available
instruments of communication. With the danger of criminal
penalties looming for political speech in the wrong place at the
wrong time, it may discourage some citizens from communicating
altogether. The Hill template could also achieve this result indirectly
by stigmatizing the groups or individuals targeted by these speech
regulations, suggesting to the public at large that they are too surly
and extreme in their views for serious consideration by a civilized
polity, and thereby reducing the potential effectiveness of any speech
they are able to get past the new regulatory roadblocks.
To be an American today is to believe that the sidewalks, streets,
and parks have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
292
public questions.”
The traditional public forum is too central a
medium of social and political communication to permit this kind of
piecemeal erosion whenever some form of political incorrectness is
being purged from the public square. Now is the time for true
champions of the First Amendment to rescue the vanishing public
forum.

292. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).

